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INTRODUCTION
Suppose I were to give you the following rule: Federal law preempts state law
under the Supremacy Clause1 if, and only if, there is a “logical contradiction”2 between
the two laws. And now suppose I were to ask you: Would there be preemption if
federal law required states to “accept and use” a particular document in registering
voters, and a state, as part of accepting and using that voter registration form, required
an additional piece of evidence not required by federal law?3 Would it matter if the
state required that additional piece of evidence simply to verify a question required
on the federal form? How would such a situation compare to the Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA) approval of a prescription-drug label that a state jury later
determined to be insufficient as a matter of state tort law in warning users of rele-
vant risks?4 Would it matter for purposes of finding a federal-state logical contradic-
tion whether the jury award was based on a theory of negligence or strict liability?
Likewise, would the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) prohibition on the use and
possession of marijuana5 logically contradict a state law permitting the recreational
use and possession of marijuana within the state?6 Would the nature of this federal-
state conflict change if, before the state passed this law, the U.S. Deputy Attorney
General had issued a memorandum announcing that the federal government would
not be enforcing the CSA as applied to the medical use of marijuana?7
1 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
2 This “logical contradiction” test, derived from Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L.
REV. 225, 260 (2000), is one of the proposals to reform preemption doctrine that will be
examined most closely in the coming pages.
3 See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2249
(2013).
4 Compare Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558–59 (2009) (holding that FDA approval
of drug warnings does not provide a defense for tort claims under state law against non-
generic manufacturers), with PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 608–09 (2011) (holding
that FDA approval of drug warnings does provide a defense for tort claims under state law
against generic manufacturers).
5 21 U.S.C. § 872, Schedule I(c)(10) (2012).
6 See generally Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034, 1035–36 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of motion for leave to file bill of complaint).
7 See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382913275
6857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD8U-265S].
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At this point, you might be having an LSAT flashback, with all the horrors of
grouping together an orchestra consisting of four different string, three brass, and
two woodwind instruments. But these are not mere logic games. These are real cases
arising under the Court’s preemption doctrine—one of the most frequently litigated,
politically divisive, and financially costly areas of constitutional law.8
Over the past twenty-five years there has been a spate of scholarship on preemp-
tion, but the vast majority of this work has focused on narrow and factually driven
questions relating to why preemption should or should not occur in a particular area
of the law,9 not the more conceptually challenging problem of how to disentangle
the mass and welter that we know as preemption law. This is largely because what
draws most commentators to the subject of preemption is not the ether of doctrinal
niceties, but rather the “meat and drink” of advocacy. That is, to put it more vul-
garly, most academic work on the subject seeks either to defend the Plaintiffs’ or
Defense Bar on particularly controversial areas of litigation.10 As a result, despite
the fact that almost every law review article on preemption begins by describing the
“chaos” pervading the doctrine,11 most scholars, advocates, and judges simply accept
what Justice Scalia recently described as “[t]he Court’s make-it-up-as-you-go-along
approach to preemption[.]”12
There are, however, two notable exceptions to this complacency: (1) Professor
Caleb Nelson, who, more than fifteen years ago, authored one of the most influential
8 See infra Section I.B.
9 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug
Cases, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 463, 464–65 (2009) (discussing preemption in the field of medical
drugs); David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV.
411, 412 (2003) (discussing federal preemption in the field of products liability).
10 FDA preemption of state tort law has incited the most productivity—and division—
among commentators. For the anti-preemption side, which is generally associated with pro-
gressive politics and commands the majority of academic scholarship, see, e.g., THOMAS O.
MCGARITY,THE PREEMPTION WAR:WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES
(2008); PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE
QUESTION (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling Trend in Preemp-
tion Rulings, TRIAL, May 2008, at 62; Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption:
Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C.L.REV. 1089 (2007); Robert S. Peck, A Separation-
of-Powers Defense of the “Presumption Against Preemption,” 84 TUL.L.REV. 1185 (2010).
For the pro-preemption side, which is generally associated with libertarian or conservative
politics, see, e.g., Epstein, supra note 9; Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Preemption
of State Common Law by Federal Agency Action: Striking the Appropriate Balance that
Protects Public Safety, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1203 (2010); Daniel E. Troy, The Case for FDA
Preemption, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 81 (Richard
A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) [hereinafter FEDERAL PREEMPTION]; Alan Untereiner,
The Defense of Preemption: A View from the Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1257 (2010).
11 Owen, supra note 9, at 412–13 (listing synonyms of “chaotic” that commentators have
used).
12 Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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law review articles on preemption, offering a new understanding of the Supremacy
Clause as turning on logical contradictions, and giving rise to Nelson’s “logical
contradiction” test;13 and (2) Professor Stephen Gardbaum, who, in six different
works, beginning in 1994, has developed the argument that the Court’s preemption
doctrine, to the extent it does not deal with consistency between federal and state
laws, is not actually derived from the Supremacy Clause but rather from somewhere
else in the Constitution.14 Although there have been other significant works chal-
lenging the normative underpinnings of the Court’s preemption doctrine,15 Nelson’s
and Gardbaum’s works are unmatched in their sophistication and influence in re-
conceptualizing the Court’s preemption doctrine in terms of legal consistency.16
As valuable as their works on preemption are, however, they both share the
same flaw: Both scholars gloss over the difficulty of determining what it means for
laws to contradict each other, a heretofore ignored point in the commentary on their
work.17 Thus, Nelson’s and Gardbaum’s theories, though certainly the most promising
13 Nelson, supra note 2, at 231, 234, 260 (2000).
14 See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767
(1994) [hereinafter Gardbaum, Nature of Preemption]; Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitu-
tional Federalism, 74 TEX.L.REV. 795 (1996); Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism
and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483 (1997); Stephen Gardbaum,
Preemption, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1989 (Leonard W. Levy
& Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000); Stephen Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt
the States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39 (2006) [hereinafter Gardbaum, Congress’s Power]; Stephen
Gardbaum, The Breadth vs. the Depth of Congress’s Commerce Power: The Curious History
of Preemption During the Lochner Era, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 10, at 48
[hereinafter Gardbaum, Breadth vs. Depth].
15 See, e.g., Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of Federal Preemption: Reformulating the
Black Letter Rules, 33 PEPP.L.REV. 25 (2005); Robert R. Gasaway & Ashley C. Parrish, The
Problem of Federal Preemption: Toward a Formal Solution, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra
note 10, at 219; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve
the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L.REV. 1 (2007); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption
Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1991); Thomas W. Merrill,
Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008); Mark D. Rosen,
Contextualizing Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 781 (2008); Ernest A. Young, Federal
Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 10, at 249.
16 That both Nelson’s and Gardbaum’s theories link the Supremacy Clause with legal
consistency makes it quite surprising that their works engage each other with only a few
fairly dismissive references. See Gardbaum, Congress’s Power, supra note 14, at 44–46, 45
n.26; Nelson, supra note 2, at 234 n.32.
17 Daniel Meltzer’s powerful critique of Nelson’s test (in what was Professor Meltzer’s
last article before his untimely passing) comes the closest to addressing this point. But Meltzer
does not question whether Nelson’s understanding of the test actually tracks the meaning of
logical contradictions. Instead, Meltzer questions whether Nelson’s test would produce
different results from the Court’s preemption framework, and whether the test would succeed
in constraining judicial discretion. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112
MICH. L. REV. 1, 31 (2013).
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of efforts to clarify preemption law, cannot cash out doctrinally until we can agree
on what a contradiction means in the preemption context—which, as indicated in
this Article’s introductory paragraph, is no easy task.18
This task is particularly relevant now that Professor Nelson’s former boss, Justice
Thomas,19 has adopted Nelson’s “logical contradiction” test as the best way of apply-
ing the original meaning of the Supremacy Clause20—thereby giving rise to what
Daniel Meltzer has dubbed the “Nelson/Thomas” test.21 Even if the test were to com-
mand a majority, however, which will likely turn on who replaces Justice Scalia,22
we might not get more consistency in this area of the law, given that even Justice
Thomas, the leading advocate of the test on the Court, has proved to be inconsistent
in applying the test—not only in when he has applied it, which of course is common
in controversial areas of constitutional law, but more problematically, in how he has
applied it.23 This is not to fault Justice Thomas: Nelson’s application of the test in
his article is inconsistent due to his fuzzy definition of what constitutes a “logical con-
tradiction.” The problem is the test itself—more particularly, its dependency on an
ambiguous concept that it fails to define.
My goal in this Article is two-pronged, grounded in both practice and theory.
My practical goal is to clarify how the concept of “logical contradictions” can be
deployed in preemption law more effectively and predictably, in an effort to help the
doctrine fulfill its purpose of creating, as Professor Henry Hart famously wrote in
1954, “a single system of law[.]”24 Hart was well aware of how “difficult it may be
on occasion to discern in advance which of two or more conflicting voices really
carries authority[,]” but he found this reconciliation of inconsistency to be an essential
18 Indeed, the standard offered in the introductory paragraph—i.e., that federal law pre-
empts state law if, and only if, there is a logical contradiction between the two laws—is
Nelson’s test. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 260.
19 Nelson clerked for Justice Thomas in the 1994–1995 term, raising a very interesting
trivia question: How many times has a Justice adopted his or her former clerk’s scholarly pro-
posal to reform an area of law? I am not sure of the answer, but it is a fascinating question about
the persuasive authority on the Court that former clerks may later exercise as legal scholars.
20 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 590 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing Nelson, supra note 2, at 260–61).
21 Meltzer, supra note 17, at 32.
22 Just two years after Wyeth, Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Scalia and Alito,
joined Thomas’s opinion in applying the logical contradiction test to preempt state tort label-
ing lawsuits against generic drug manufacturers using FDA-approved labels. See PLIVA,
Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 607 (2011). Justice Kennedy joined Thomas’s opinion, except
for Part III-B-2, id., the section adopting and applying the “logical contradiction” test, id. at
621–23 (opinion of Thomas, J.). With Justice Scalia’s recent passing, however, there are
currently only three clear votes for the test.
23 See infra notes 302–14 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Thomas’s
inconsistent application of the test.
24 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.REV.
489, 489 (1954).
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task for any legal system, given that “[p]eople repeatedly subjected, like Pavlov’s
dogs, to two or more inconsistent sets of directions, without means of resolving the
inconsistencies, could not fail in the end to react as the dogs did.”25 My practical
goal is to help prevent this “nervous breakdown”26 that Hart identified as threatening
our system.
In the process of pursuing this practical goal, I also have an ancillary theoretical
agenda, and that is to show how preemption, just like stare decisis, is central to the
judiciary’s role in pursuing the rule of law through the doctrine’s promotion of consis-
tency. Although there has been some recognition among judges and scholars of how
stare decisis promotes the rule of law by making adjudication more consistent,27 the
relationship between preemption and the rule of law has been entirely ignored, even
though preemption, just like stare decisis, is designed to make our legal system con-
sistent—that is, to prevent us from becoming Pavlovian dogs, responding arbitrarily
to inconsistent commands.
The Article will proceed as follows. Part I will examine the problem underlying
the Court’s preemption jurisprudence—the problem of doctrinal incoherence. After
Section I.A outlines the four branches of the Court’s preemption analysis, Section I.B
will trace how the Court has developed these four branches. In tracing this develop-
ment, Section I.B will draw heavily from Stephen Gardbaum’s chronology of the
Court’s preemption jurisprudence, but will depart from Gardbaum’s tripartite chro-
nology to carve the Court’s jurisprudence into five distinct periods.28 Through this
analysis, Section I.B will demonstrate that although each of the first four periods
represented a coherent, though arguably flawed, view of the Supremacy Clause, the
fifth period, in which the Court consolidated the previous four periods into its current
four-part doctrine, is incoherent in the literal sense of that word.
Section I.B.5.a, in exploring this fifth period, will focus on how the Roberts
Court has adjudicated preemption cases. This Section will conduct an original
empirical overview of the twenty-eight preemption cases that the Roberts Court has
decided over its first eleven years. This empirical overview will analyze the rate at
which the Roberts Court has ruled in favor of preemption—broken up by the voting
of the individual Justices (Section I.B.5.a.i), case subject-matter (Section I.B.5.a.ii),
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 849 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S.
369 (2004); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479 (1987);
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983), overruled by
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Lewis F. Powell, Stare Decisis
and Judicial Restraint, 62 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 15, 18 (1991); Antonin Scalia, Assorted
Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 581 (1989).
28 See Gardbaum, Nature of Preemption, supra note 14, at 785–805.
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and preemption branch (Section I.B.5.a.iii). After demonstrating that some subjects
and branches have a much stronger relationship than others to division within the
Supreme Court, this discussion will conclude that, although it is unclear whether the
Court’s division is the cause or result of doctrinal incoherence, it is nonetheless clear
that creating a more coherent preemption doctrine will promote the rule of law by
limiting the financial costs and adjudicative unpredictability associated with pre-
emption litigation.
Part II will examine proposed solutions to this rule-of-law problem, dividing
these solutions into formalist and functionalist approaches. Professors Nelson and
Gardbaum have proposed the leading formalist solutions in seeking to reconceptualize
preemption doctrine to turn only on the formal or logical relationship between the
normative content embodied in the federal and state laws.29 Professor Dan Meltzer,
before his untimely passing, provided what I believe to be the most powerful func-
tionalist criticism, focusing in particular on what he dubs the “Nelson/Thomas”
test.30 For Meltzer, preemption analysis cannot rest on formal categories, such as an
abstract notion of logical contradictions.31 Rather, as a form of statutory interpreta-
tion, preemption requires courts to make factually sensitive inquiries into whether
the state law would undermine or interfere with the purpose and functioning of the
particular federal law at issue.32 Part II will conclude with a discussion of why, given
functionalism’s relationship with the doctrinal incoherence and preemption politics
discussed in Section I.B.5, a formalist rather than a functionalist approach is better
suited to clarifying preemption doctrine and thereby promoting the rule of law.
Part III will then take a turn to advance my own formalist solution, which will
incorporate many of the elements of the approaches discussed in Part II. In develop-
ing my proposal, Section III.A will take a step back and consider preemption as part
of a broader set of legal doctrines designed to establish legal consistency—what I
call “consistency doctrines.” Section III.B will then consider how the Court has con-
ceptualized the meaning of legal consistency through its various consistency doctrines.
After demonstrating how the Court has generally employed a normative conception
of consistency, whereby courts look to whether the conflicting normative content pulls
an agent in opposing doctrines, Section III.C will ground this normative consistency
in formal logic, focusing in particular on the deontic logic theorem forbidding norma-
tive systems from requiring and forbidding an agent to perform the same action.
Section III.D will then apply this normative consistency to preemption law to derive
the following rule: Federal law should displace state law under the Supremacy Clause
if, and only if, the normative terms of the two laws impose conflicting obligations
on the subjects of those laws, either through conflicting prohibitions, requirements,
or rights.
29 See infra Section II.A.
30 Meltzer, supra note 17, at 32.
31 Id. at 33–34.
32 Id. at 34.
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Part IV will wrap up the discussion by distinguishing my proposed “normative
consistency” test from Gardbaum’s “supremacy” approach, Nelson’s “logical contradic-
tion” test, and the Court’s “direct conflict” analysis. To illustrate how my test is similar
to, but distinct from, these various approaches, Part IV will apply my test to several
contemporary problems plaguing preemption law, focusing in particular on one of
the most controversial areas—FDA preemption. The Article will thus come full circle
to answer some of the questions posed in its first paragraph. Finally, the Article will
conclude with some reflection on what lessons the preceding discussion offers for
understanding the rule of law and the nature of consistency within our legal system.
I. THE PROBLEM: DOCTRINAL CHAOS
Let us start with some preemption basics. The Court has derived its preemption
doctrine from the Supremacy Clause in Article VI,33 providing that:
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.34
From this language, the Court has developed a four-part preemption framework—
consisting of express, field, impossibility, and obstacle preemption.35
A. The Four Branches of the Preemption Tree
These four branches stem from the two primary branches of preemption—
express and implied preemption.36 Under express preemption, federal law displaces
state law if federal law explicitly says that, for a given set of facts, federal and not
state law governs the controversy.37 Under implied preemption, federal law displaces
state law not expressly through its text, but implicitly through the structure or purpose
of the federal regulation at issue.38 There are two types of implied preemption: field
33 See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (plurality opin-
ion) (explaining that it is “under the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine
is derived”).
34 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
35 See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
36 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000).
37 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992).
38 Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1210 (1998).
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and conflict preemption.39 Field preemption arises when the intent or effect of fed-
eral law is to occupy the entire field in an area of law, so as to leave no room for any
state regulation in that area.40 Conflict preemption arises, of course, when federal law
conflicts with state law, but the Court has broken conflict preemption into two parts—
direct conflict preemption (also known as “impossibility preemption”)41 and indirect
conflict preemption (also known as “obstacle preemption”).42 Whereas impossibility
preemption arises when compliance with both federal and state law would be actually
impossible,43 obstacle preemption arises when state law would pose some sort of an
obstacle to a federal law’s purpose or objectives, despite the possibility of a subject
complying with both laws.44 The Court’s preemption framework thus consists of two
primary categories, express and implied preemption, but with four distinct tests or
branches falling within those two principal categories.
B. The Path to the Four Branches
In developing these four preemption branches from the Supremacy Clause, the
Court has taken a slow and circuitous path, with cases lurching and veering in dif-
ferent directions, oftentimes without employing clearly defined jurisprudential terms
or categories. Indeed, the term “preemption” did not become part of our constitutional
nomenclature until 1917, when Justice Louis Brandeis used the term in his dissent-
ing opinion in New York Central Railroad v. Winfield.45 From its start, preemption law
was messy, with the very name being a misnomer, clumsily appropriated from the
39 Nelson, supra note 2, at 226.
40 See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
41 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 589–90 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Throughout the Article, I will use the terms “direct conflict preemption” and “impossibility
preemption” interchangeably.
42 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 228–29 (explaining that obstacle preemption occurs where
state law hinders the purposes of federal law, rather than its explicit mandates). Throughout
the Article, I will use the terms “indirect conflict preemption” and “obstacle preemption”
interchangeably.
43 See, e.g., Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
44 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (holding a state law preempted
because it stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress”).
45 244 U.S. 147, 169 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority had erred
in concluding “that Congress has, by legislating on one branch of a subject relative to inter-
state commerce, preëmpted the whole field” (emphasis added)). Justice Brandeis was dissenting
from the majority’s conclusion that the Federal Employer Liability Act, which subjected private
railroads to liability for employment accidents, superseded, or “preempted” in Justice Brandeis’s
words, the New York Workmen’s Compensation Act—which provided compensation for
employment accidents, including those arising from work on railroads, without requiring
proof of negligence. Id. at 154.
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property law doctrine giving ownership of unoccupied land to its first developers.46
Preemption law has become only messier since its christening, as the Court has added
new doctrines on top of one another, without much attention to how these doctrines
relate to one another conceptually.
Although in form the four branches of preemption appear to be analytically discrete
categories, in practice they often overlap. As Justice Blackmun put it in English v.
General Electric Co.,47 the categories are not “rigidly distinct.”48 Moreover, not only
are the categories not rigidly distinct, but there is also significant disagreement over
the implications of this overlap. Consider, for example, how Justice Blackmun, to
support his claim in English that the categories are not “rigidly distinct,” pointed to
how field preemption is a species of conflict preemption.49 Blackmun seems to have
committed a logical error, however, in making this claim: conflict preemption (includ-
ing both the impossibility and obstacle branches) appears to be a species of field
preemption, rather than the other way around, because field preemption seems to be
the broader category, in that it excludes all state laws that overlap with federal law,
not just those that pose impossibility and obstacle conflicts. This error is particularly
significant because, as we will discuss below, English is the canonical modern pre-
emption case, in assembling the various tests accumulated over two hundred years
of preemption jurisprudence into a single doctrinal framework.
We see this confusion exacerbated two years later in another significant preemp-
tion case, Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n.50 In Gade, the plurality,
after using obstacle preemption to rule that OSHA regulations preempted Illinois’s
46 To preempt something means, literally, to purchase something before another person
does—it is the first option to buy. Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction to
FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 10, at 1. The term has been extended to non-financial contexts
to mean to take anticipatory action. Hence, a “preemptive strike” is to wage a military assault
before one’s opponent gets the opportunity to do so. Preemption, as applied to property law,
did bear this temporal meaning: It represented a squatter’s right to establish property
ownership in anticipation of future settlement. See, e.g., Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16, 5
Stat. 453 (1841) (repealed 1891). For example, the Preemption Act of 1841 sought “to grant
pre-emption rights” to individuals who were already living on federal property. Id. But
Justice Brandeis applied this temporally laden term to a concept that has no temporal mean-
ing. Winfield, 244 U.S. at 169. That is, Brandeis’s use of the term would suggest that preemption
is a doctrine about the federal and state governments racing to regulate new areas of conduct,
with the Supremacy Clause favoring, as the Preemption Act did, whoever gets to that frontier
first. The Supremacy Clause of course bears no such temporality. Federal law nullifies con-
trary state law, no matter which law came first.
47 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
48 Id. at 79 n.5.
49 Indeed, after conceding that these categories are not rigidly distinct, Justice Blackmun
observed in the next sentence how “field pre-emption may be understood as a species of
conflict pre-emption” because “[a] state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with
Congress’ intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation.” Id.
50 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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licensing of hazardous waste equipment operators,51 cited Justice Blackmun’s argu-
ment in English for the proposition that the plurality could have relied “as easily”
on field preemption for this conclusion.52 The plurality thus seemed to interpret Justice
Blackmun’s argument in English to mean that obstacle preemption cases necessarily
involve field preemption, despite the fact that Blackmun had stated—pardon the
pun—in plain English the opposing proposition: that field preemption necessarily
involves conflict preemption.53 Further confusing matters, the Gade plurality ac-
knowledged that it largely agreed with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the judg-
ment, where he argued that express preemption was a more appropriate vehicle for
finding OSHA preemption.54 The English and Gade opinions illustrate the confusion
underlying modern preemption jurisprudence—namely, how it involves overlapping
branches, forming what Stephen Gardbaum terms a “hydra-like monster.”55
In terms of Greek mythology, however, the doctrine may be more like Proteus,
Homer’s amorphous sea god, than the Hydra of Lernato, in that the Court’s preemp-
tion framework is not simply a multi-headed doctrine, but one that, like Proteus,
assumes different shapes and forms, evading accountability in the process.56 Below,
we will draw from Gardbaum’s work tracing the creation of this hydra-like monster
to three distinct jurisprudential periods.57 But in keeping with the notion that the
51 Id. at 96–104.
52 Id. at 104 n.2 (“Although we have chosen to use the term ‘conflict’ pre-emption, we
could as easily have stated that the promulgation of a federal safety and health standard ‘pre-
empts the field’ for any nonapproved state law regulating the same safety and health issue.”).
53 English, 496 U.S. at 79 n.5 (“[F]ield pre-emption may be understood as a species of
conflict pre-emption[.]”). Indeed, if Blackmun was right in English about field preemption
being a subset of conflict preemption, that would mean that whenever there is field preemp-
tion, there would necessarily be conflict preemption, but it would not mean that whenever
there is conflict preemption (as the plurality argued there was in Gade), there would
necessarily be field preemption.
54 Indeed, although the plurality was “persuaded” by Justice Kennedy’s argument “that
the text of the Act provides the strongest indication” that the case should have been decided
on the basis of “express preemption,” Gade, 505 U.S. at 104 n.2, and although the plurality
agreed with Justice Kennedy that “Congress intended the promulgation of a federal safety
and health standard to pre-empt all nonapproved state regulation of the same issue,” the
plurality ultimately decided that it “prefer[red] to place this case in the category of implied
pre-emption[,]” id.
55 Gardbaum, Congress’s Power, supra note 14, at 45.
56 Of course, according to folklore, Proteus would yield the truth to anyone skilled enough
to see past his many forms and grab a hold of him. Menelaus eventually succeeded in grasping
Proteus, who, after transforming into various entities, finally relented and guided Menelaus back
to his wife Helen. My hope in this Article is that we will similarly be able to take a hold of this
protean doctrine, so that we too can be guided back to its purpose of promoting legal consistency.
57 Gardbaum divides preemption into three periods: 1789–1912 (under which federal law
was “supreme” and therefore displaced any conflicting state laws), 1912–1933 (under which
federal law automatically displaced all state laws occupying the same area or field of
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doctrine is more protean than hydra-like, we will complicate Gardbaum’s relatively
clean, tripartite account.
We will do this in two ways. One, we will divide the Court’s preemption juris-
prudence into five periods. Two, we will highlight how instead of replacing the doctrine
from the preceding period with a new doctrine, each period has made preemption
more and more muddled by heaping overlapping doctrines on top of those prevailing
in previous periods—ultimately creating a preemption framework that is always
susceptible to transformation and adaptation, eluding whoever seeks to grasp it.
1. The Conflict Period: 1789–1912
Under the first preemption period, covering 1789 to 1912, federal laws dis-
placed state laws, automatically and necessarily, to the extent that the federal and
state laws conflicted with one another. This period most closely resembles what we
now know as impossibility preemption. Indeed, during this period, the Court used
the following language about the need to find an inconsistency between federal and
state law to nullify state law under either the Supremacy Clause or the dormant com-
ponent of the Commerce Clause58: the state law must “stand in [the] way” of federal
law;59 present a “collision”60 or “a direct inconsistency”61 with federal law; pose a
regulation), and 1933–present day (under which federal law displaces state law according to
congressional discretion). Gardbaum, Nature of Preemption, supra note 14, at 265–71.
58 During this period, the Court oscillated between using the Supremacy Clause and the
Dormant Commerce Clause to invalidate state laws that conflicted with federal laws. See
generally Viet D. Dinh, Federal Displacement of State Law: The Nineteenth-Century View,
in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 10, at 27.
59 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 199–202, 236–37 (1796) (finding a conflict be-
tween (1) a 1777 Virginia law, passed under then-Governor Thomas Jefferson, sequestering
British property to raise money for the Revolutionary War, and (2) the 1783 Treaty of Paris,
which, in ending the Revolutionary War, gave British creditors the right to recover from
American debtors—on the ground that “laws of any State, contrary to [a] treaty, [must be
declared] void[,]” for “[a] treaty cannot be the Supreme law of the land, that is of all the
United States, if any act of a State Legislature can stand in its way”).
60 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 9, 28, 210 (1824) (finding a conflict between
(1) an 1808 New York law, giving one party an exclusive license to operate a ferry on the
Hudson River from New York City to Elizabethtown Point, New Jersey, and (2) the Federal
Navigation Act of 1793, providing that licensed ships “shall be . . . entitled to the privileges
of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade”—on the ground that the 1808 New York
license created a “collision with an act of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which
that act entitles him”).
61 Thurlow v. Massachusetts (The License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 618–20 (1847)
(Woodbury, J., concurring) (finding no conflict between (1) state restrictions of alcohol sales,
and (2) federal alcohol importation laws—on the ground that, according to Justice Levi
Woodbury, “[t]here must be an actual collision, a direct inconsistency, and that deprecated
case of ‘clashing sovereignties,’ in order to demand the judicial interference of this court to
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“direct and positive [conflict with federal law], so that the two acts could not be
reconciled or consistently stand together”;62 or pose such an inconsistency that it
would have “the effect of destroying the right of the State to act on the subject.”63
Although the Court did find preemption in some of these cases where there was
arguably not such a direct conflict between federal and state laws,64 the Court con-
sistently represented its case law as warranting displacement of state law only if there
was not simply a difference but an actual inconsistency between federal and state
laws—meaning that under this standard “non-conflicting state laws [were] immune
from federal displacement.”65
A pivotal case during this period, signaling its end and the beginning of the second
period, was Reid v. Colorado,66 which involved whether the federal Animal Industry
Act, regulating the interstate transportation of livestock, trumped an 1885 Colorado
statute, prohibiting the importation into the state of cattle or horses with an infectious
or contagious disease.67 At one point, the Court seemed to rest its analysis on a field
reconcile them” (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 487 (1819),
overruled in part by Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890)).
62 Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 238–39, 243 (1859) (finding a conflict
between (1) Alabama requirements that vessels in its state waters file a statement identifying
each vessel and its owners, and (2) the overlapping requirements in the Federal Navigation
Act of 1793—on the ground that “the repugnance or conflict [is] direct and positive, so that
the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together”); see also Mo., Kan. &
Tex. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 616–20, 623, 638–39 (1898) (finding no conflict be-
tween (1) a Kansas law creating a cause of action against carriers who bring infected cattle
into the state, and (2) the Animal Industry Act, regulating the interstate transportation of
livestock—on the ground that it is “the settled rule that a statute enacted in execution of a
reserved power of the State is not to be regarded as inconsistent with an act of Congress
passed in the execution of a clear power under the Constitution, unless the repugnance or
conflict is so direct and positive that the two acts cannot be reconciled or stand together”
(citing Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) at 243)).
63 Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251, 253–58 (1908) (finding no conflict between (1) a Kansas
law criminalizing the bringing of cattle into the state that had not been properly inspected under
federal law, and (2) the National Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring such inspection—on
the ground that federal authority over inspection did not have “the effect of destroying the
right of the State to act on the subject”).
64 Indeed, Davenport—which provided the paradigmatic “direct conflict” language that
courts should not find preemption unless the inconsistency is “direct and positive, so that the
two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together”—invalidated a state law that
provided requirements that simply overlapped with federal law. 63 U.S. (22 How.) at 236,
238–40, 243. As Professor Viet Dinh writes, “with Davenport, redundancy became a ground
for conflict.” Dinh, supra note 58, at 27, 32.
65 Gardbaum, Congress’s Power, supra note 14, at 47.
66 187 U.S. 137 (1902).
67 Id. at 142 (declaring the issue as whether “the subject of the transportation of cattle
from one State to another has been so far covered by the act of Congress known as the Animal
Industry Act”).
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preemption analysis,68 but just a couple of pages later in the opinion, the Court, quot-
ing the landmark Sinnott v. Davenport69 decision, switched to a direct conflict preemp-
tion analysis, the prevailing standard at the time.70 Ultimately, however, the Court
found that there was no preemption because the Colorado law “[did] not cover the same
ground as the act of Congress and therefore [was] not inconsistent with that act[.]”71
The Reid Court’s reasoning is notable because of what it suggests about the
relationship between consistency and redundancy: the Court held that the state law
was permissible because it was consistent with federal law, but it was consistent
with federal law because it did not overlap with federal law.72 The Court thus upheld
the prevailing rule of this period that content consistency is the principal Supremacy
Clause criterion, but in doing so, the Court made content redundancy the criterion
for content consistency—thus intimating, but not completing, the transition into the
second period. In this second period, what we will call “the jurisdictional period,”
the Court was more explicit in holding that formal inconsistency was no longer a
necessary condition for the displacement of state law under the Supremacy Clause.
2. The Jurisdictional Period: 1912–1933
Ten years after Reid, in Southern Railway Co. v. Reid,73 the Court completed
this transition from the conflict to the jurisdictional period by invalidating a North
Carolina law requiring common carriers to receive freight and quickly transport it
as soon as received to interstate points74 on the ground that the North Carolina law
touched the field occupied by the Interstate Commerce Commission.75 The Court
68 Id. at 146–47.
[W]hen the entire subject of the transportation of live stock from one
State to another is taken under direct national supervision and a system
devised by which diseased stock may be excluded from interstate
commerce, all local or State regulations in respect of such matters and
covering the same ground will cease to have any force, whether for-
mally abrogated or not[.]
Id.
69 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227 (1859).
70 Reid, 187 U.S. at 148.
This court has said—and the principle has been often reaffirmed—that
“in the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress
in a case where the State law is but the exercise of a reserved power,
the repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two
acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together.”
Id. (quoting Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) at 243).
71 Id. at 150.
72 Id.
73 222 U.S. 424 (1912).
74 Id. at 425.
75 Id. at 442.
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rested its reasoning entirely on a content redundancy analysis,76 ignoring the content
consistency reasoning that had appeared, though somewhat meekly, in Reid. Indeed,
in Southern Railway, it did not matter that the Commission had not acted in a way
that might potentially conflict with the North Carolina law.77 All that mattered was
that the Commission had the authority to act in the field of interstate railroad transporta-
tion, rendering any state law in that field redundant and therefore impermissible.78
Southern Railway thus began a new period, whereby the federal and state gov-
ernment shared concurrent powers, but state authority within a field automatically
and necessarily ceased once the federal government entered the area—like patrons
scattering from an old western tavern after the fastest gunslinger makes his entrance.
Gardbaum dubs the state’s authority that of the “first mover,” in that the states have
the power to move into a regulatory field first, but are then displaced once the federal
government enters the field of regulation.79 We might likewise call the federal gov-
ernment’s power the “gunslinger authority,” in that the federal government’s
entrance in a field entirely displaces the state’s presence.
This transition seemed to supplant, rather than add to, the Court’s conflict pre-
emption doctrine, because, as mentioned above, whenever there is a conflict between
the content of federal and state law, the two laws necessarily occupy the same field
of regulation, thus requiring displacement under this new jurisdictional conception
of preemption. We should emphasize that the Court was far from clear on the pre-
cise nature of this transition, as the Court continued to use conflict language in the
second period,80 but there was nonetheless a significant shift away from a conflict
conception (whereby the focus was on whether the terms of federal and state law
might collide with another) and toward a jurisdictional conception (whereby the
focus was on whether the fields of federal and state regulation overlapped with one
another).81 Just as conflict preemption language bled into the second period, the
Court also flirted during this jurisdictional period with the notion that congressional
intent is the touchstone for preemption analysis,82 but the Court did not fully endorse
76 See id. at 437 (asserting that the issue was whether federal law had “take[n] control of
the subject-matter”).
77 See id. (“There is no contention that the Commission has acted, so we must look to the
act.”).
78 Id. (“Does [the act of Congress], as contended by plaintiff in error, take control of the
subject-matter and impose affirmative duties upon the carriers which the State cannot even
supplement? In other words, has Congress taken possession of the field?”).
79 Gardbaum, Congress’s Power, supra note 14, at 48.
80 See, e.g., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 117 (1913) (“Congressional regulation
does not exclude state regulation except so far as the former, lawfully exercised, conflicts
with the latter.”).
81 See, e.g., Southern Railway, 222 U.S. at 437.
82 See, e.g., Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) (finding no conflict between (1) an
Indiana statute requiring a label disclosing the ingredients of commercial animal food, and
(2) the federal Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 prohibiting misbranding but not requiring
996 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:981
this view until Mintz v. Baldwin,83 which initiated what we will call “the discretion-
ary period.”
3. The Discretionary Period: 1933–1941
Mintz involved whether Congress’s 1903 Cattle Contagious Diseases Act dis-
placed New York’s authority to apply its own inspection requirements to incoming
cattle that had “not [been] inspected by, and no certificate [had been] issued under,
federal authority.”84 Under the gunslinger authority, Congress’s enactment of the
Cattle Contagious Diseases Act, by itself, should have eliminated New York’s power
to subject entering cattle to its own inspection laws. That is, the state’s power should
have automatically and entirely dissipated upon enactment of the federal law. De-
parting from this standard, however, the Court held that jurisdictional displacement
did not operate automatically and necessarily, but rather optionally and contingently
according to congressional intent: “The intention . . . to [preempt state law] must
definitely and clearly appear.”85 And because that intent was not clearly expressed in
the Act, the Mintz Court found no preemption.86
Mintz thus meant that Congress could negate or affirm displacement of state law
simply through its expressed intent. Like the previous jurisdictional period, this new
discretionary approach seemed to supplant, rather than add to, the Court’s previous
doctrines, because if preemption operates according to congressional intent, then the
entire analysis should turn on what the federal statute says, not the relationship of
the normative content inhering in the federal and state laws. For example, if the
statute says that Congress does not have exclusive power over the field, then under
the Mintz reasoning the overlapping coverage should not warrant displacement of
state law.87 But if the statute says it does, then under Mintz that should end the
publication of ingredients—because “such intent [to supersede state authority] is not to be im-
plied unless the act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State”).
83 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933).
84 Id. at 351.
85 Id. at 350.
86 Specifically, by interpreting Congress’s intent in the Cattle Contagious Diseases Act
to provide that “[t]he express exclusion of state inspection extends only to cases where
federal inspection has been made and certificate issued[,]” the Court was able to conclude
that, because the particular cattle at issue in Mintz had not been subject to such federal inspec-
tion, Congress must have intended to preserve New York’s authority to subject these cattle
to its own laws. Id. at 350–51. Note how we see in this reasoning the beginning of the
presumption against preemption—which was not formally incorporated into preemption
doctrine until fourteen years later in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947). Once intent became the touchstone of the inquiry, the matter of how to divine intent
from federal enactments became central to preemption controversies, thus giving rise to the
ongoing debate over whether this intent approach warrants the Rice presumption against
preemption. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085,
2092 (2000) (arguing against a presumption for or against preemption).
87 The Court has suggested that this discretionary approach means that Congress can,
through its expressed intent, negate the displacement of state law, even when there is an
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inquiry—not because the state law is normatively or jurisdictionally inconsistent
with the federal law, but simply because Congress has forbidden any state regulation
in that area. Under this discretionary approach, preemption becomes an exercise in
interpreting the federal statute, not one of discerning the normative or jurisdictional
relationship between federal and state laws.88
In the fourth period, the Court continued its progression toward finding preemp-
tion to be optional and contingent, according to congressional intent, but the Court
added a more functional focus to this inquiry, finding preemption if the state law
would undermine the purpose of the federal law, even if Congress had not expressly
stated this objective.
4. The Functional Period: 1941–1990
Although a functional approach to federal-state conflicts had animated many of
the Court’s preemption decisions, dating back to McCulloch v. Maryland,89 the
Court did not fully endorse a functional approach until Hines v. Davidowitz,90 a case
arising from Pennsylvania requiring stricter alienage registration than was required
under federal law.91 The Hines Court began its opinion with a field coverage analy-
sis,92 but several pages later the Court acknowledged that its preemption precedents
apparent direct conflict between federal and state law. Cf. Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t
of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 506–07 (1986) (holding that there was no preemption of a state
law forbidding abandonment of contaminated land on which toxic wastes had been dumped,
despite a federal bankruptcy law expressly permitting such abandonment in some circum-
stances, because there was no legislative history in federal bankruptcy code indicating
Congress’s intent to preempt important state environmental laws).
88 See Mintz, 289 U.S. at 350 (“The purpose of Congress to supersede or exclude state ac-
tion . . . is not lightly to be inferred. The intention so to do must definitely and clearly appear.”).
89 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 330 (1819). We should flag here that McCulloch is a landmine
for preemption scholarship and case law. It can be read to justify an expansive view of
preemption—an interpretation that those supporting a functional approach support. It also
may be read, more persuasively in my opinion, not as a preemption case at all, but rather as
turning on intergovernmental immunities (i.e., as holding Maryland’s taxation of the Bank
invalid not because of the supremacy of federal law but because of the immunity of federal
institutions from state regulation). See infra notes 254–63 and accompanying text.
90 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
91 Whereas the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act required aliens to register annually
with the state, to carry a state-issued alien identification card, and to pay a $1 annual regis-
tration fee, the federal Alien Registration Act, passed the year after the Pennsylvania law,
required aliens only to register one time with the federal government and did not require an
identification card. Id. at 59–61.
92 Id. at 62–63.
First. That the supremacy of the national power in the general field of
foreign affairs, including power over immigration, naturalization and
deportation, is made clear by the Constitution [means that] . . . [w]hen
the national government by treaty or statute has established rules and
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had employed several terms requiring an actual inconsistency between federal and
state law.93 Here, the Court was of course referring to the tension between the first
and second periods discussed above. The Court then explained that it found both of
these periods unsatisfactory, because they applied “an infallible constitutional test
or an exclusive constitutional yardstick . . . [to an area of law where] there can be no
one crystal clear distinctly marked formula.”94 The Court then announced a new test
that would be more malleable and open-ended in accounting for case-specific factors.
Under this new test, the Court’s “primary function is to determine whether, under
the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania’s law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”95
The Court did not rely here on Congress’s stated intent, which is what seems to
have been required under the Mintz reasoning.96 Indeed, the Court did not inquire at all
into whether Congress intended to displace the Pennsylvania law. Rather, the only ques-
tion for the Hines Court was whether the Pennsylvania law would have undermined
the Court’s determination of the purpose of the federal law.97 As a result, even if
Congress had specifically expressed that it intended not to displace state law, the
Court would still need to rule in favor of preemption if the Court found that the state
regulations touching the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of
aliens as such, . . . [n]o state can add to or take from the force and
effect of such treaty or statute[.]
Id.
93 In Justice Black’s words, the Court had “made use of the following expressions:
conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; incon-
sistency; violation; curtailment; and interference.” Id. at 67.
94 Id. The irony that the absolutist, textualist Justice Black wrote these words should not
be lost on the reader. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting) (“First Amendment freedoms, for example, have suffered from a failure of the
courts to stick to the simple language of the First Amendment in construing it, instead of
invoking multitudes of words substituted for those the Framers used.”). Adding to the irony,
then-Justice Stone, who was of course a legal realist in many ways, took a more formalistic
approach in dissent, claiming that there is a
long established principle of constitutional interpretation that an exercise
by the state of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded
by federal action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict
is so “direct and positive” that the two acts cannot “be fairly reconciled
or consistently stand together,”
Hines, 312 U.S. at 80 (Stone, J., dissenting) (quoting Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (5 How.) 227,
243 (1859)). Justice Stone thus concluded that the Court should have upheld the Pennsylvania
law here because “compliance with the state law does not preclude or even interfere with
compliance with the act of Congress.” Id. at 81. That Justice Black would support a functional
approach to preemption—and Justice Stone a formal one—is just one of the many jurispru-
dential oddities wrought by preemption. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
95 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
96 See 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933).
97 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
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law in question stood as an obstacle to Congress’s evident purpose and objective in
enacting it.98
The Hines Court thus seemed to wrap the previous periods of preemption to-
gether so as to form a new, all-encompassing, functionalist category—one that
essentially comes down to a judicial determination. Once again, the Court’s previous
doctrines were replaced by, or at least assimilated into, the Court’s new way of
dealing with preemption—an interpretation of Hines affirmed in such significant
later cases as Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.99 and Florida Lime & Avocado Growers
v. Paul.100 It was not until 1990 that the Court formally and completely consolidated
these various conceptions of preemption into a single doctrinal framework.
5. The Consolidation Period: 1990–Present
Before 1990, there were efforts to consolidate the Court’s various tests,101 but, as
mentioned above,102 it was not until English v. General Electric Co. that a majority of
the Court fully articulated the four-part test that we now know as preemption doctrine.
This represented a substantial reconceptualization of preemption.103 As discussed
98 Indeed, the Court has since interpreted Hines to mean that it is the Court’s duty to
apply an obstacle preemption analysis even if Congress has specifically limited the preemp-
tive effect of the federal statute to impossibility preemption. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281–84 (1987).
99 331 U.S. 218 (1947). The Rice opinion is arguably the first to synthesize the express,
field, and conflict branches of the preemption tree, but the Court’s reasoning did not treat
these as independent prongs, but rather interdependent factors in the overriding functional
question of how the state law relates to the Court’s determination of the purpose of the
federal law. See id. at 230–31. That is, statutory language, field coverage, and content in-
consistency were all relevant to the Court’s analysis, but only to the extent that they relate
to whether the state law would undermine the purpose of the federal law. See id. As the Court
put it, “[t]he question in each case is what the purpose of Congress was.” Id. at 230.
100 373 U.S. 132 (1963). In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, after citing Hines
for the proposition that federal displacement of state law turns on “whether the state regulation
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress,’” id. at 141 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67), the Court concluded that, “[b]y that
test, we hold that [the California avocado regulation] is not such an obstacle; there is neither
such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same
area, nor evidence of a congressional design to preempt the field,” id. The semicolon in that
conclusion seems to function as a “because”—meaning that the Court concluded that there
was no obstacle preemption because there was no field or direct conflict preemption. See id.
101 In Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), for example, the Court did consolidate
the express, field, and conflict preemption prongs, but in doing so, it treated conflict preemption
to mean only obstacle preemption, thus ignoring the first period of the Court’s preemption
jurisprudence. Id. at 525–26. In California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272 (1987), Justice Marshall presented four distinct branches, but in a part of the opinion that
Justice Stevens did not join, thus denying it the status of a majority opinion. Id. at 280–81
(plurality opinion).
102 See supra text accompanying note 35.
103 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).
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above, each of the four previous periods offered a novel conception of preemption
based on a new judicial understanding of what it means for federal law to be supreme
over state law. But over the past twenty-five years, beginning with the English decision,
the Court has taken a different, and in my view, irrational, approach to preemption law.
Instead of choosing one of the previous four periods and using that conception of pre-
emption consistency as the governing test, or simply offering a new conception to sup-
plant the previous ones, the Court has consolidated all of these internally consistent
and independently derived conceptions of consistency into a single framework, with
each conception applying to almost any preemption scenario presented before a court.
This is irrational, in the literal sense of the word, because the first four preemption peri-
ods were not intended to, and conceptually do not, form a coherent framework together.
The various doctrines, and the jurisprudential periods they represent, are rational in
isolation, but not together as a doctrinal framework. This gives preemption the dubious
distinction of being the most doctrinally confused area of constitutional law.104
Why has the Court taken this irrational approach? One way to understand this
development is in terms of jurisprudential style and theory. For example, we can under-
stand the conflict period as expressing a formalist view of law, whereby logic consti-
tutes the core of how judges understand legal consistency. The jurisdictional period,
by contrast, embodies the judicial philosophy that law should be uniform, not neces-
sarily because of any commands from formal logic, but because divergent legal
104 There are, to be sure, other areas of law where doctrinal consolidation is unreasonable,
but one would be hard-pressed to say that such areas of law are actually irrational in a logical
sense. For example, Establishment Clause law is probably the most widely criticized area of
the Court’s jurisprudence for being chaotic, incoherent, and even contradictory. See, e.g., John
W. Huleatt, Accommodation or Endorsement? Stark v. Independent School District: Cause in
the Tangle of Establishment Clause Chaos, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 657, 657 (1998); Shahin
Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause Analy-
sis, 40 AM.U.L.REV. 503, 504 (1990). This is because the multiple Establishment Clause tests
often times pull in different directions, thereby giving judges an opportunity to pick and choose
doctrines based on their preferred outcomes. Even in this convoluted area of law, however, there
is significantly more order than in preemption. Indeed, courts, scholars, and advocates generally
agree that the Endorsement Test applies when the government authorizes religious displays,
see, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring), the Coer-
cion Test applies when the government leads or induces oral speech, see, e.g., Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992), and the infamous Lemon Test, from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612–13 (1971), applies when the government funds religious organizations and activities—
breaking down into the Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649, 652 (2002), rule when
there is indirect funding and the Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807–09 (2000) (plurality
opinion) (opinion of Thomas, J.), rule when there is direct funding. This is, to be sure, a highly
complicated set of doctrines, and they certainly tug in different directions, but they are not irra-
tional as a whole, because for the most part practitioners understand that the doctrines operate
independently of one another, applying in different factual scenarios. Modern preemption law,
by contrast, involves the consolidation of independent and internally consistent conceptions of
what the Supremacy Clause means into one doctrinal framework—with each one overlapping
with the other and applying to almost every preemption scenario presented before a court.
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norms are burdensome on private enterprise.105 The discretionary period dovetails with
the advent of legal realism, a discursive approach to law whereby the normative content
of federal and state law does not bind judges; what truly matters under this approach is
the judicial effectuation of congressional will.106 The functional period shifted this
power away from Congress and toward the federal judiciary, as part of the period in
American law when courts embraced a more activist and functional role in furthering
congressional purposes—an approach that is related to but conceptually distinct from
seeking to effectuate Congress’s intent or the normative content of the laws Con-
gress enacted. And finally, the Rehnquist Court, as it often did, sought to doctrin-
alize the Court’s divergent strands, in an effort to stop the advancement of the Court’s
progressivism in its tracks,107 while still honoring the Court’s precedents in form.108
The Rehnquist Court’s doctrinal consolidation, though perhaps a worthwhile
judicial goal in seeking to secure compromise among the Justices’ divergent views,
is largely responsible for the chaos pervading contemporary preemption law. Section
I.B.5.a will take an empirical turn to explore this chaos, particularly on the Roberts
Court.
105 Gardbaum has argued that this period can be understood in terms of the Lochner
Court’s politics, favoring a narrow but deep federal authority so as to achieve its economically
libertarian goals. See Gardbaum, Breadth vs. Depth, supra note 14, at 48–50.
106 Likewise, Gardbaum claims that the New Deal Court favored a congressional discre-
tion approach because, as the Court expanded congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause, it sought to limit preemption so that Congress could exercise its will as to when to
preserve state authority. See id. at 70–71.
107 See Neal Devins, Ideological Cohesion and Precedent (or Why the Court Only Cares
About Precedent When Most Justices Agree with Each Other), 86 N.C. L. REV. 1399, 1413–
15 (2008). In this respect, the Rehnquist Court’s approach recalls William F. Buckley’s fa-
mous definition of a conservative as someone who “stands athwart history, yelling Stop[.]”
William F. Buckley, Jr., Our Mission Statement, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19, 1955), http://www
.nationalreview.com/article/223549/our-mission-statement-william-f-buckley-jr [https://perma
.cc/4HCV-XDAX]. Much of the legal conservative movement can be understood in such
terms—i.e., as an effort to stop, or at least slow down, what may appear to be the ineluctable
force of progressive change in law, particularly in constitutional law. For discussions of the
legal conservative movement, see generally MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE MCLAUGHLIN, THE
FEDERALIST SOCIETY: HOW CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK FROM LIBERALS (2013);
JEFFERSON DECKER, THE OTHER RIGHTS REVOLUTION: CONSERVATIVE LAWYERS AND THE
REMAKING OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2016); AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH
CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION
(2015); ANN SOUTHWORTH,LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT:PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE
COALITION (2008); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT:
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2010).
108 One of the best illustrations of this practice is United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
553–59 (1995), where Chief Justice Rehnquist sought to incorporate all of the Commerce Clause
precedents, even those that many conservatives abhorred, such as Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and assimilate them into a
three-part test.
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a. The Roberts Court: Doctrinal Incoherence and Preemption Politics
This Section will consider the politics of preemption, based on an original
empirical overview of the twenty-eight preemption cases that the Roberts Court has
decided over its first eleven years.109 In particular, this Section will analyze the rate
at which the Roberts Court has ruled in favor of preemption, broken up by case
subject-matter and preemption branch, demonstrating that some subjects and branches
have a much stronger relationship than others to division within the Supreme Court.
Based on this analysis, this Section will conclude that although it is unclear whether
the Court’s division is the cause or result of doctrinal incoherence, it is nonetheless
clear that creating a sharper and more coherent preemption doctrine will promote the
rule of law by limiting the financial costs and adjudicative unpredictability associ-
ated with preemption litigation.
Before we explore these cases, however, I would first like to explain my methodol-
ogy. My list includes only those cases that actually employ a preemption analysis
to the facts. In assembling this list, I used, but did not rely exclusively on, the Supreme
Court Database,110 the most widely used dataset for political scientists studying the
Supreme Court. Although the Database is extremely useful, it sometimes uses legal
terms in ways that depart from how legal practitioners and scholars understand the law,
leading political scientists to form conclusions that do not conform to legal practices.
I did not rely exclusively on the Database for precisely this reason. The Data-
base includes two categories for preemption: (1) “federal pre-emption of state court
109 Although there has only been limited empirical work on preemption, there have been
some significant contributions. The most valuable such contribution is Michael S. Greve &
Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment,
14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43 (2006). A subsequent Greve et al. article compared preemption in
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. Michael S. Greve et al., Preemption in the Rehnquist and
Roberts Court: An Empirical Analysis, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 353 (2015). My empirical
analysis differs from the Greve et al. analysis both in terms of the depth (my analysis is much
more cursory) and findings (my analysis includes, as well as excludes, some cases that the
2015 Greve et al. article does not). These departures will be highlighted in the following
discussion. Some other important empirical works on preemption are CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS
& JOHN C. BLAKEMAN, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND NEW FEDERALISM: FROM THE
REHNQUIST TO THE ROBERTS COURT (2012); Brady Baybeck & William Lowry, Federalism
Outcomes and Ideological Preferences: The U.S. Supreme Court and Preemption Cases,
PUBLIUS, Summer 2000, at 73; Gregory M. Dickinson, An Empirical Study of Obstacle Pre-
emption in the Supreme Court, 89 NEB L. REV. 682 (2011); Bradley W. Joondeph, The
Partisan Dimensions of Federal Preemption in the United States Courts of Appeals, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 223; David M. O’Brien, The Rehnquist Court and Federal Preemption: In
Search of a Theory, PUBLIUS, Fall 1993, at 15; David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law,
Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 1125 (1999).
110 Harold J. Spaeth et al., 2016 Supreme Court Database, Version 2016 Release 1, SUP.
CT. DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/ [https://perma.cc/TG5Q-QAQ7].
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jurisdiction,” and (2) “federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state
regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitu-
tional interpretation unless the Court says it does.”111 This first category is arguably
a form of preemption in a technical sense, in that it involves federal law displacing
state authority, but it does not fit with how courts apply preemption doctrine. That
is, courts do not apply the four branches of preemption to cases raising the question
whether state court jurisdiction has been eliminated by federal court jurisdiction. As
a result, the Database is overinclusive, including six non-preemption cases, only two
of which even mention the word “preempt” in any of the opinions, and none of which
apply the Court’s preemption analysis.112
Scholars who have relied on the Database for their lists have collected cases that
vary greatly from my list. For example, one of the most extensive empirical surveys
of preemption appears in Christopher Banks and John Blakeman’s The U.S. Supreme
Court and the New Federalism: From the Rehnquist to the Roberts Court, and as a
result of relying exclusively on the Database, the Banks and Blakeman analysis in-
cludes two non-preemption cases.113 Curiously, Banks and Blakeman do not include
in their list the other four non-preemption cases featured on the Database. Perhaps
even more curiously, Banks and Blakeman add seven cases that are not featured on
the Database, but only one of these is a preemption case.114
111 Analysis Specifications—Modern Data (1946–2015), SUP.CT.DATABASE, http://scdb
.wustl.edu/analysis.php [https://perma.cc/86Y9-RY2N].
112 The six non-preemption cases included on the Database are the following: (1) Vaden
v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), a federal jurisdiction case that mentions the word
“preempt” in a non-doctrinal sense but does not apply preemption analysis all; (2) Smith v.
Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 291 (2011), an Anti-Injunction Act case that does not mention the
word “preempt” at all; (3) Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523 (2008), an International
Court of Justice enforceability case that does mention the word “preempt” in citing the U.S.
Amicus Brief but does not apply preemption analysis at all; (4) Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S.
180 (2009), a federal habeas case that does not mention the word “preempt” in any of the
opinions; (5) Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010), a comity case that does
not mention the word “preempt” in any of the opinions; and (6) Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S.
__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013), a federal jurisdiction patent case that does not mention the word
“preempt” at all.
113 The cases are Vaden, 556 U.S. 49, and Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 291. BANKS &BLAKEMAN,
supra note 109, at 279–80.
114 The only preemption case is AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
BANKS & BLAKEMAN, supra note 109, at 327. The remaining six are non-preemption cases:
(1) Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), a Federal Arbitration
Act case that does not mention the word “preempt” in any of the opinions; (2) Norfolk
Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158 (2007), a Federal Employers’ Liability Act
case that does not mention the word “preempt” in any of the opinions; (3) CSX Transportation,
Inc. v. Georgia State Board of Equalization, 552 U.S. 9 (2007), a Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act case, rejecting the state’s independent authority to determine railroad
property tax rates, but not mentioning the word “preempt” at all; (4) Florida Department of
Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33 (2008), a bankruptcy tax case that does not
mention the word “preempt”; (5) Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance
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By reviewing all of the cases on the Database, as well as all of the cases featured
in every major piece of empirical work on preemption, and then excluding all of the
cases that do not contain a single opinion employing a preemption analysis to the
facts, I collected the twenty-eight decided cases included in Appendix A.115 I found
several interesting trends in these cases, described below.
i. Voting Breakdown by Justice
Of the twenty-eight preemption cases decided between 2006 and 2016, the Roberts
Court has ruled in favor of preemption nineteen times, a 68% preemption rate,116
significantly higher than the preemption rate of previous Courts.117 This has prompted
many liberal scholars to point out the internal inconsistency of a conservative-led
Court favoring preemption, a doctrine that limits state autonomy, at such a high
rate.118 Of course, this principle-decisional inconsistency (i.e., this inconsistency
between a Justice’s general legal principles and particular case decisions) is common
Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010), an Erie case, involving whether, for purposes of diversity juris-
diction, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 prevails over New York’s bar on class actions for
certain statutory-damages claims; Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is the only opinion to mention
the word “preempt” but even this opinion does not apply the analysis, id. at 437 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting); (6) CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Revenue, 562 U.S.
277 (2011), a Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act case, holding that the Act
prohibits states from imposing discriminatory tax rates against railroads and rejecting the
state’s independent authority to determine railroad property tax rates; the opinion does men-
tion how the Act speaks in “preemptive terms,” id. at 293, but none of the opinions applies
the preemption analysis to determine the scope of these terms.
115 I counted twenty-nine preemption cases that have been argued before the Roberts Court,
but one case, Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440, 441 (2008), was not decided, because
the Court divided 4–4 on the outcome, with Chief Justice Roberts not participating in the case.
116 Infra Table 1.
117 For example, in an extensive empirical study of preemption between 1921 and 1993,
David O’Brien found that 92 of 183 preemption cases (50.2%) were decided in favor of
preemption. O’Brien, supra note 109, at 522.
118 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 62.
One would expect that a conservative Court, committed to protecting
states’ rights, would narrow the scope of federal preemption. After all,
a good way to empower state governments is to restrict the federal
government’s reach. Restricting preemption gives state governments
more autonomy.
But there is every indication that the Roberts Court, although un-
questionably conservative, will interpret preemption doctrines broadly
when businesses challenge state and local laws.
Id. Curiously, there has been nearly no criticism the other way around: The liberal Justices
also violate, or at least substantially undermine, their own theories of process federalism by
opposing preemption, but conservatives seem not to notice, or not to mind, this inconsistency.
This may be because some conservative scholars are delighted to see the liberal Justices
embrace some judicially enforced limitations on federal authority, even if it is expressed in
ways conservatives might disfavor in particular cases.
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to all legal issues relating to federalism—one’s position on federal authority often
comes down to the old question of whose ox is being gored119—but as compared to
other areas of federalism, this inconsistency is much more common in preemption
cases. Indeed, we see much more principle-decisional consistency among both liberals
and conservatives in Commerce Clause cases, no matter the regulation at issue.120
With preemption, however, particularly under the Roberts Court, we see liberal
Justices supporting limits on federal authority more often than conservatives. For ex-
ample, Justice Ginsburg voted for preemption in only thirteen out of the twenty-eight
Roberts Court preemption cases (a 46% rate), and Justice Sotomayor voted for preemp-
tion at an even lower rate, in eight out of the nineteen Roberts Court preemption cases
in which she has issued a vote (a 42% rate).121 By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts voted
for preemption in twenty-one of the twenty-eight cases (a 75% rate), the highest rate on
the Court.122 The next highest ratio belongs to Justice Kennedy, who voted for preemp-
tion twenty out of twenty-eight times (a 71% rate).123 The remaining conservatives—
Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas—voted for preemption nineteen, eighteen, and
sixteen times, respectively, out of twenty-seven voting opportunities (70%, 67%, and
59% rates, respectively).124 The remaining liberals—Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer,
and Kagan—voted for preemption at 56%, 67%, 57%, and 53% rates, respectively.125
Notably, these ideological divisions on preemption have appeared outside of the courts,
as vividly illustrated in the Bush II Administration’s openly supporting preemption,
based on the possible “disrupt[ion]” that state courts might impose on federal drug
regulation,126 and the Obama Administration’s vigorously opposing preemption, as
119 See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 948 (1994) (arguing that “claims of federalism are often
nothing more than strategies to advance substantive positions” and that “people declare them-
selves federalists when they oppose national policy, and abandon that commitment when they
favor it”). This is because federalism is a jurisdictional rather than a substantive principle.
As a result, support for limitations on federal authority often relates to which party controls
the federal government—a relationship evidenced by liberals favoring federalism more during
the Bush years and conservatives favoring it more during the Obama years. See Kathleen M.
Sullivan, From States’ Rights Blues to Blue States’ Rights: Federalism After the Rehnquist
Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 810–11 (2006) (observing a similar trend in the 1950s).
120 The paradigmatic case in which federalism, as a constitutional principle, prevailed over
bare party politics is Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
121 See infra Table 1.
122 See infra Table 1.
123 See infra Table 1.
124 These three Justices all participated in only twenty-seven preemption decisions. See
infra Table 1.
125 See infra Table 1. The Roberts Court sample is somewhat small, however, for Justices
Stevens and Souter, who issued votes in only nine Roberts Court preemption cases. Kagan
has issued a vote in fifteen Roberts Court preemption cases, and Breyer has issued a vote in
all twenty-eight. See infra Table 1.
126 See, e.g., Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3969 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
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part of its commitment to “the legitimate prerogatives of the States[,]”127 a commit-
ment that the Administration has not always displayed in other areas of law.128
One of the more interesting features of the voting breakdown is that ideological
divisions have arisen not only between, but also within, the conservative and liberal
wings of the Court.129 Indeed, the Republican-appointed Justices most squarely within
the pro-preemption wing of the party are the libertarian Justice Kennedy and the
pro-business Chief Justice Roberts, and the Republican-appointed Justice least likely
to favor preemption is the more tradition-oriented and communitarian Justice Thomas.
This distinguishes preemption from many other areas of constitutional law, where
there is often a strong correlation between how conservative a Justice is, based on
Martin-Quinn scores,130 and how the Justice will rule on a given case. For example,
based on how conservative a Justice is under the Martin-Quinn metric, we can gen-
erally predict the likelihood of a Justice ruling in favor of extending non-economic
individual liberties (such as abortion or gay rights) or in favor of limiting the federal
commerce power—the more conservative, the less likely to extend non-economic
liberties and the more likely to limit the federal commerce power.131
For preemption, however, while there is generally such a correlation on the liberal
wing of the Court—with the liberal Justices on the far left of the judicial ideological
spectrum (Ginsburg and Sotomayor) less likely to favor preemption than the liberal
Justices closer to the center (Kagan and Breyer)—this correlation does not hold for the
conservative wing of the Court—with the center-right Justices (Roberts and Kennedy)
more likely to favor preemption than those farther to the right (Alito, Scalia, and
Thomas). Thus, while there is a general relationship between conservatism and favoring
§§ 201, 314, 601) (declaring that preemption is required, because “[i]f State authorities, including
judges and juries applying State law, were permitted to reach conclusions about the safety and
effectiveness [of labels] . . . , the federal system for regulation of drugs would be disrupted”).
127 See, e.g., Preemption: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693 (May 20, 2009) (declaring that “preemption of State
law by executive departments and agencies should be undertaken only with full consideration
of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient legal basis for preemption”).
128 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(holding that the Affordable Care Act Medicaid requirements for states were unconstitutional).
129 Following federalism principles in the preemption context means ruling for more gov-
ernmental regulation on a subject—thus highlighting a growing rift within the Republican
Party between the pro-preemption, business-oriented, libertarian wing, and the anti-preemption,
tradition-oriented, communitarian wing. It should be noted that this division has animated
the development of preemption doctrine, with the conservative Lochner Court favoring pre-
emption, because it was principally a libertarian form of conservatism that dominated that
era of jurisprudence. See Gardbaum, Breadth vs. Depth, supra note 14, at 48.
130 See generally MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/ [https://perma
.cc/25G5-F635].
131 See generally Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Friendly Precedent, 57 WM.&MARY
L. REV. 1789, 1807–09 (2016) (using two Commerce Clause cases to show that the result cor-
related with the Court’s ideological mean).
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preemption, there is the opposite relationship for degrees of conservatism and favor-
ing preemption. There seems to be something about the center of the judicial spectrum
that is conducive to favoring preemption. Table 1 illustrates this phenomenon by
tabulating the voting of the Justices on the twenty-eight preemption cases and lining
up the Justices left-to-right according to how liberal or conservative they are under
the Martin-Quinn methodology.
1 = Pro-Preemption; 0 = Anti-Preemption; NP = Did not participate; NC = Not on the Court
See Appendix A for a full list of the cases.
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ii. Voting Breakdown by Case Subject-Matter
We can further see the Court’s ideological divisions, both between and within the
factions on the Court, by breaking preemption cases down by particularly salient sub-
jects. Of the twenty-eight Roberts Court cases, four involved the question of whether
the FDA preempted state tort actions, an issue of particular interest to the Defense Bar
and the Bush Administration.132 In these four cases, the Court ruled for preemption
three times, as did Justices Kennedy and Thomas, but Chief Justice Roberts, along
with Justices Alito and Scalia, voted for preemption in all four cases.133 Justice Breyer
voted for preemption in one of these four cases.134 By contrast, Justice Ginsburg voted
for preemption in none of the four cases,135 and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor voted
for preemption in none of the three in which they were involved.136
1 = Pro-Preemption; 0 = Anti-Preemption; NP = Did not participate; NC = Not on the Court
See Appendix A for a full list of the cases.
Likewise, in the larger category of cases that could be characterized as tort reform
preemption cases, which includes these four FDA cases but also includes five other
cases in which a plaintiff’s access to a judicial tort remedy was at issue,137 the ideologi-
cal divide is equally sharp. The Court ruled for preemption in six of these nine cases,
with Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Scalia and Alito, supporting preemption
132 Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
133 See infra Table 2.
134 See infra Table 2.
135 See infra Table 2.
136 See infra Table 2.
137 Mutual Pharm., 133 S. Ct. 2466; Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. __, 132
S. Ct. 1261 (2012); Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323 (2011); PLIVA,
Inc., 564 U.S. 604; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Bruesewitz
v. Wyeth, 562 U.S. 223 (2011); Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555; Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70
(2008); Riegel, 552 U.S. 312.
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in all but one (an 89% rate, substantially above their aggregate rates for all preemption
cases),138 and Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg, the most ardent anti-preemption
members, supporting preemption in none (far below their respective aggregate 42%
and 46% rates for all preemption cases).139
1 = Pro-Preemption; 0 = Anti-Preemption; NP = Did not participate; NC = Not on the Court
See Appendix A for a full list of the cases.
We see the opposite scenario if we move from an area where liberals favor state
autonomy (tort reform) to one where they do not (immigration reform). In the three
Roberts Court cases involving whether federal immigration law preempted state
immigration reform,140 Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor completely reversed their
positions, becoming pro-preemption proponents, supporting preemption in all three.141
This is particularly interesting for Sotomayor, given that she voted for preemption
in only eight cases overall;142 these three constituted nearly half of all of her pro-
preemption votes. In this area of law, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy stuck
to their strong pro-preemption stances, supporting preemption of state-led immigra-
tion reform in two of the three cases.143 But Justices Alito and Thomas supported
preemption in none of the three cases,144 which is especially noteworthy for Alito,
138 See infra Table 3. The only tort reform preemption case in which these Justices did not
vote for preemption was Williamson, 562 U.S. 323. See infra Table 3.
139 See infra Table 3. Justice Ginsburg participated in all nine of these decisions, but
Justice Sotomayor participated in only six. See supra Table 1.
140 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013);
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Chamber of Commerce of the
U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011).
141 See infra Table 4.
142 See supra Table 1.
143 See infra Table 4.
144 See infra Table 4.
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given that he had the third highest aggregate preemption rate at 70%.145 In fact, in im-
migration law, Alito was the mirror image of Sotomayor, in that these three immi-
gration cases accounted for three of the eight cases in which Alito voted against
preemption.146 Immigration preemption divided the conservative wing of the Court
more than any other issue, which should not be surprising, given that immigration
has been dividing the Republican Party in general.147 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy, representing the more culturally progressive and pro-business faction of
the Republican Party, and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas, representing the more
traditionalist and communitarian faction of the Republican Party, seem to have car-
ried their policy preferences into their preemption decision-making.
1 = Pro-Preemption; 0 = Anti-Preemption; NP = Did not participate; NC = Not on the Court;
NA = Not Available. See Appendix A for a full list of the cases.
iii. Voting Breakdown by Preemption Branch
The Roberts Court decided five of these twenty-eight preemption cases by a strictly
unanimous ruling (i.e., without either a dissenting or a concurring opinion)148—an
18% rate, far below the Roberts Court average of rendering unanimous decisions in
slightly over 50% for all types of cases.149 All of these five unanimous preemption
145 See supra Table 1.
146 See supra Table 1; infra Table 4.
147 See generally María Pabón López & Natasha Ann Lacoste, Immigration Reform in
2013–14: An Essay on the Senate’s Bipartisan Plan, the House’s Standards for Immigration
Reform, Interest Convergence and Political Realities, 17 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 121 (2014)
(discussing congressional battles between Republican factions over immigration reform).
148 Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014); Tarrant Reg’l Water
Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013); Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,
569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1769 (2013); Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
149 See Adam Liptak, Justices Agree to Agree, at Least for the Moment, N.Y. TIMES
(May 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/us/supreme-court-issuing-more-unani
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decisions either found no preemption or found preemption based on the express
branch of the doctrine.150
The most sharply divided implied preemption cases on the Roberts Court have
arisen under conflict preemption. Of the seven Roberts Court decisions finding conflict
(impossibility or obstacle) preemption, four rested on razor-thin five-Justice majori-
ties.151 By contrast, of the eleven cases finding express preemption, only one rested on
a five-Justice majority, and that was likely a result of Justice Thomas not participat-
ing.152 Moreover, all of the four conflict preemption cases decided by five-Justice ma-
jorities involved the politically controversial subjects of tort reform or immigration.153
In sum, while a more thorough empirical analysis is certainly necessary to investi-
gate whether preemption doctrine has contributed to all of this division, between and
within the familiar coalitions on the Court, it is clear from our preliminary survey
that the Roberts Court is deeply fractured over preemption. It is equally clear that
when there have been “strange bedfellow” opinions on the Roberts Court, it has had
more to do with a serendipitous alignment of judicial politics than the efficacy of
preemption doctrine in constraining judicial discretion. Whether the incoherence of
preemption doctrine is the symptom or the direct cause of what Thomas McGarity
calls “the preemption war[,]”154 this incoherence is certainly part of the problem.
Indeed, one does not need to take the position that legal doctrines absolutely constrain
judicial discretion and generate decisional outcomes to believe that what Justice
Scalia recently dubbed “[t]he Court’s make-it-up-as-you-go-along approach to
mous-rulings.html [https://perma.cc/LLQ7-3AZT] (stating that the rate of unanimous rulings
in recent years had been between 40% and 60%).
150 Northwest, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1429; Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. at 2137; Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. at
1778; Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 565 U.S. at 468; Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. at 85–87. A tempting way to
look at these cases is that express preemption doctrine created the consensus. This is likely a
partial rather than a complete explanation. The other part of the explanation may be that the Jus-
tices already agreed with one another on the outcome and the Court then used express preemp-
tion to provide the most narrow and least controversial basis for that outcome. This account is
supported by the fact that express preemption is rarely utilized in cases involving controversial
subjects, such as immigration and tort reform, despite being appealed to by the party seeking
preemption. Indeed, only one of the nine Roberts Court tort reform preemption cases was decided
on the basis of express preemption. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 231–33 (2011).
None of the three immigration preemption cases was decided on the basis of express preemption.
See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253–57 (2013)
(finding that proof of citizenship requirements under Arizona law was “inconsistent with” the
National Voting Rights Act); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502–06
(2012) (finding preemption largely on field and obstacle grounds); Chamber of Commerce of
the U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 600 (2011) (finding no express preemption).
151  Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (5–4 decision);
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (5–3 decision); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011) (5–4
decision); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (5–4 decision).
152 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 4 (2007).
153 See supra Tables 3, 4.
154 MCGARITY, supra note 10, at 58.
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preemption[,]”155 is a problem and must be reformed so as to create some peace
between these warring positions. Even if a clearer preemption doctrine would not
produce more consensus among the Justices, it would at least cut down on the enor-
mous costs incurred in litigating preemption cases under each of the current branches
of the preemption tree.156 There have been several important proposals to cut down
on these transaction costs—proposals that we will cover in Part II by dividing them
into formalist and functionalist approaches.
II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: FORMALIST AND FUNCTIONALIST APPROACHES
Formalist solutions have sought to reconceptualize preemption doctrine to turn
only on the formal or logical relationship between the normative content embodied in
the federal and state laws.157 This does not necessarily require returning to the first or
second periods discussed above, but such an approach is obviously much more in
line with these periods than with the third and fourth. Functionalist solutions, by con-
trast, have focused more on the practical relationship between federal and state laws,
calling for courts to make factually sensitive and careful inquiries into the applicable
federal statute, including its drafting history and broader context, to determine whether
the state law would undermine or interfere with its purpose.158 This often comes
down to balancing the federal and state interests at stake in that particular regulatory
scheme. Such proposals, therefore, endorse the latter two periods much more than
the former two, though functionalist proposals often consolidate all of the factors
expressed in the various periods as part of one all-encompassing, all-things-considered,
balancing test.159 Below, we will examine the leading formalist and functionalist
155 Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
156 For a rough sample of just the litigation generated by the Bush Administration’s FDA
Preemption Preamble, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies
and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 237–42 (2007). Just as partisan
politics have dominated preemption cases in the Supreme Court, they have had the same
effect on the lower courts. Indeed, not only does the doctrine not constrain the Court itself,
but it does not even constrain lower courts under vertical stare decisis. See Joondeph, supra
note 109, at 225 (finding that “in the most contested preemption cases—those in which at
least one Republican and one Democrat served on the panel, and at least one judge dissented—
Republican appointees were more than three times as likely as Democratic appointees to vote
in favor of preemption (roughly 73% versus 21%)”). As the eminent Professor Geoffrey
Hazard has summarized the problem, the Court’s preemption doctrine has proven “incapable
of dealing with ‘the relations between state and federal law’ in a satisfactory way.” Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., Quasi-Preemption: Nervous Breakdown in Our Constitutional System, 84
TUL.L.REV. 1143, 1145 (2010) (quoting Hart, Jr.,  supra note 24, at 489). This has produced
“huge transaction costs” and “cynicism about government and disrespect for the rule of law.”
Id. at 1155–56.
157 Gardbaum, Nature of Preemption, supra note 14, at 771.
158 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 17, at 56–57.
159 See id. at 39.
2017] PREEMPTION AS A CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE 1013
proposals, in the process evaluating their relative strengths and weaknesses, before
moving on to use these proposals to develop our own proposal in Part III.
A. Formalist Proposals
In a groundbreaking 1994 article, Professor Stephen Gardbaum made one of the
most novel and compelling proposals to reform preemption doctrine.160 According
to Gardbaum, the term “supremacy” in the Supremacy Clause refers to consistency
and, therefore, does not warrant the displacement of state laws unless there is an
actual inconsistency between federal and state laws.161 Thus, to the extent that pre-
emption does not deal with consistency between federal and state laws, the doctrine
is not actually derived from the Supremacy Clause but rather from somewhere else
in the Constitution—most plausibly, Gardbaum argues, from the Necessary and
Proper Clause.162 In five subsequent works, Gardbaum has built on this argument,
claiming that the Supremacy Clause, viewed as a consistency guarantee, warrants
only impossibility preemption.163
Caleb Nelson’s proposal164 resembles Gardbaum’s argument but differs in two
fundamental ways. One important difference is methodological: whereas Gardbaum’s
argument is largely conceptual, in that he derives his claim about preemption from his
conception of what supremacy means in the preemption context,165 Nelson’s argument
is more historical, looking to a wealth of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources166
to argue that the phrase “to the Contrary notwithstanding” in the Supremacy Clause
is a “non obstante clause.”167 Such clauses, Nelson explains, were widely used by
“legal draftsman in late eighteenth-century America . . . to acknowledge that a statute
160 Gardbaum, Nature of Preemption, supra note 14.
161 See id. at 770.
162 Id. at 781–83.
163 See sources cited supra note 14; see also Gardbaum, Congress’s Power, supra note 14,
at 62. Gardbaum argues explicitly that: (1) express preemption cannot be justified under the
Supremacy Clause (because states do not enact inconsistent laws merely by contravening
Congress’s intent) but may be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause, id. at 60–61;
(2) field preemption cannot be justified under either the Supremacy Clause (because there
is no inherent inconsistency between federal and state laws covering the same category of
regulation), or the Necessary and Proper Clause (because that would make preemption im-
plied from an implied power, a double inference that Gardbaum finds untenable), id. at 61;
and (3) obstacle preemption arguably cannot be justified under the Supremacy Clause (because
“it seems reasonably clear from first principles that supremacy requires irreconcilability
between state and federal laws and not mere interference or inconvenience”), id. at 62.
164 Nelson, supra note 2, at 231–32 (providing a summary of Nelson’s assertion of conflict
preemption and rejection of obstacle preemption).
165 Gardbaum, Congress’s Power, supra note 14, at 40–43.
166 Some of Nelson’s more significant sources are Blackstone, Nelson, supra note 2, at
236–37 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59, *89–90 (1765)), eighteenth-
century statutes, id. at 238 nn.42–43 (citations omitted), and eighteenth-century state case
law on federal preemption, id. at 253–54 nn.85–86 (citations omitted).
167 Id. at 239–40, 254–60 (noting that non obstante is Latin for “notwithstanding”).
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might contradict some other laws and to instruct courts not to apply the traditional
presumption against implied repeals.”168 Nelson reasons that if we read the Suprem-
acy Clause as a non obstante clause, the Clause should operate analogously to what he
refers to as the “doctrine of repeals,” providing the presumption against later statutes
repealing previous ones.169 Just as how the repeals doctrine calls for courts to invalidate
a provision in statute X passed at time A if, and only if, statute Y passed at time A+B
conflicts with it, the Supremacy Clause commands courts to hold that a federal law dis-
places a state law if, and only if, the federal law actually conflicts with the state law.170
In framing the Supremacy Clause as a non obstante clause, so that the repeals
and preemption doctrines operate analogously, Nelson sheds light on the type of
consistency required by the Supremacy Clause. In both preemption and repeals cases,
courts must ensure a logical consistency between laws: in the repeals context, logical
consistency is required between laws passed at different times, and in the preemption
context, logical consistency is required between laws passed by different levels of
government.171 Nelson thus proposes consolidating the incoherent four-part preemp-
tion test described above into a single “logical contradiction” test.172 Nelson defines
this test in the following terms: Courts must apply preemption “to disregard state
law if, but only if, it contradicts a rule validly established by federal law.”173
That brings us to the second fundamental difference between Gardbaum’s and
Nelson’s arguments. Although both Gardbaum and Nelson hold that the Supremacy
Clause is only about legal consistency, Nelson and Gardbaum differ in what it means
for two laws to be consistent with one another. Whereas Gardbaum argues that incon-
sistency comes down entirely to the normative content embodied in the federal and
state enactments, not any intent or purpose that may have motivated their passage,174
Nelson contends that there is an inconsistency between federal and state laws not
only when federal and state laws jointly render it physically impossible for an individ-
ual to comply with both commands, but also when state law contravenes Congress’s
expressed or implied intent in the federal law.175 As a result, under Nelson’s logical
contradiction test, all of the Court’s current preemption branches, except obstacle
preemption,176 would be preserved, because under Nelson’s conception of consistency,
168 Id. at 232.
169 Id. at 241, 246.
170 Id. at 250.
171 Id. at 252.
172 Id. at 260.
173 Id.; see also id. at 234, 252.
174 Gardbaum, Nature of Preemption, supra note 14, at 770.
175 Nelson, supra note 2, at 276–77 (stating that the basic question in preemption cases is one
of congressional intent and whether the enactment was meant to set aside the laws of the state).
176 Id. at 231–32, 265–90. Nelson also argues that his interpretation of the Supremacy
Clause requires eliminating the presumption against preemption because the Supremacy
Clause, as a non obstante clause, dispels the notion that Congress intends not to displace
state law through its enactment of the relevant federal law. Id. at 290–303.
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the express, field, and impossibility branches all involve logical contradictions.177 This
is in sharp contrast with Gardbaum’s supremacy test, whereby the Supremacy Clause
warrants only conflict preemption, and perhaps, he suggests, only the impossibility
component of conflict preemption, because under Gardbaum’s conception of consis-
tency, only impossibilities involve actual contradictions.178 That is, for Gardbaum,
viewing the Supremacy Clause as a guarantee of federal-state consistency requires
justifying express and field preemption (and perhaps obstacle preemption) through
other constitutional provisions besides the Supremacy Clause,179 but Nelson, through
a more expansive understanding of what constitutes a logical contradiction in the pre-
emption context, argues almost the polar opposite—that express, field, and impossi-
bility preemption, but not obstacle preemption, involve logical inconsistencies and
therefore can be justifiably preserved as part of preemption doctrine under his “logical
contradiction” test.180
Given that both scholars derive their doctrinal prescriptions from the same
premise—that the Supremacy Clause requires only a federal-state consistency in the
preemption context—their conclusions raise an important question: Why do they
differ in how to effectuate that consistency through an actual doctrinal test? The
problem is that both scholars endorse a theory of legal consistency without exploring
and clarifying the meaning of consistency as applied to legal norms. Indeed, whereas
Gardbaum equates the Supremacy Clause with consistency, raising the question of
what consistency means in this context, Nelson takes the next step of equating con-
sistency with the law of non-contradiction in formal logic, only to raise the question
of what it means for legal norms to contradict each other as a logical matter. If we
want to reconceptualize preemption to turn on consistency, we have to be much
more explicit about how we are conceptualizing consistency.
As a result, as persuasive as Gardbaum’s argument is for arguing that preemption
is not warranted by the Supremacy Clause to the extent it deals with non-conflicting
federal and state laws, his argument does not cash out doctrinally unless he can tell us
precisely what it means for federal and state law to be consistent with one another.
Likewise, as powerful as Nelson’s argument is for adopting a “logical contradiction”
test, an argument that has converted several Justices to “Calebism,” in Rick Hills’s
177 Id. at 261 (stating that logical contradiction test includes “conflict,” “express,” and
“field” preemption).
178 See Gardbaum, Nature of Preemption, supra note 14, at 772–73. It should be noted that
Gardbaum agrees with Nelson that the presumption against preemption should be eliminated
because it does not fit with viewing the Supremacy Clause as a federal-state consistency
guarantee, nor does it seem warranted by any other constitutional provisions. Gardbaum,
Congress’s Power, supra note 14, at 63.
179 Gardbaum, Congress’s Power, supra note 14, at 60–61. Recall that Gardbaum believes
that this Necessary and Proper Clause argument can and should succeed only as applied to
express preemption. Id. at 52–54.
180 Nelson, supra note 2, at 261.
1016 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:981
words,181 Nelson’s test cannot render preemption cases more principled and predict-
able unless he can more fully articulate what it means for two laws to contradict each
other logically as opposed to practically. Indeed, ignoring the rather large and impor-
tant scholarship on this distinction between logical and practical contradictions,182
Nelson assumes in his definition of his logical contradiction test—and throughout his
article on preemption—that practical contradictions are the same as logical contradic-
tions,183 thereby enabling him to preserve much of the Court’s preemption framework,
excluding only obstacle preemption from the four branches. This makes Nelson’s
approach much more similar to functional proposals than scholars and judges have
acknowledged, as we will see in Section II.B.
B. Functionalist Proposals
In his last article before his untimely passing, Professor Dan Meltzer provided the
most powerful critique to date of Nelson’s logical contradiction test.184 In that article,
Meltzer challenged Nelson’s argument principally on the ground that it cannot accom-
modate for how federal policy is made in our increasingly complicated polity.185
181 Rick Hills, Immigration Makes Strange Bedfellows: How Arizona Convinced Scalia
and Alito to Embrace the Presumption Against Preemption, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 27, 2012),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/06/immigration-makes-strange-bedfellows
-how-arizona-convinced-scalia-and-alito-to-embrace-the-presumption-against-preemp
tion.html [https://perma.cc/CX3D-KUZK]. Indeed, as mentioned in the Introduction, Justice
Thomas has adopted Nelson’s logical contradiction test as the best way of applying the original
meaning of the Supremacy Clause—thereby giving rise to what Daniel Meltzer has dubbed
the “Nelson/Thomas” test—and there are signs that the test may soon command a majority,
depending on who replaces Justice Scalia. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
182 As we will see in Part III, Nelson’s definition of his logical contradiction test obscures
the difference between a practical contradiction (which refers to a conflict of a practical nature
in that it involves differently assembled but not necessarily logically contradictory facts) and
a logical contradiction (which refers to a conflict of a logical nature in that it formally violates
the law of non-contradiction), a distinction at the core of many of the most foundational
works in moral and legal philosophy. See infra notes 247–51 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of how this distinction between practical and logical contradictions lies at the core
of Kantian philosophy, see, e.g., Shawn D. Kaplan, A Critique of the Practical Contradiction
Procedure for Testing Maxims, 10 KANTIAN REV. 112 (2005). Due to Kant’s influence on
legal thought, this distinction between practical and logical contradictions permeates legal
philosophy. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 375 (Anders
Wedberg trans., Lawbook Exch. 2007) (1945) (arguing that “[i]t is one of the main tasks of the
jurist to give a consistent presentation of the material with which he deals” and therefore, “[t]he
specific function of juristic interpretation is to eliminate these contradictions by showing that
they are merely sham contradictions”—i.e., practical rather than logical contradictions).
183 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 260–61. Although Nelson dubs his test the “logical con-
tradiction” test, and uses the word “logical” fourteen times in his article, he never distinguishes
between practical and logical contradictions.
184 Meltzer, supra note 17.
185 See id. at 31–34.
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Meltzer focused in particular on defending obstacle preemption,186 which of course
is the primary target of Nelson’s argument in that it is the only branch excluded as
violating his logical contradiction test.187 In defending obstacle preemption, Meltzer
did not deny the oft-repeated criticism that obstacle preemption, in calling for judges
to balance federal and state interests against one another, requires enlarging judicial
discretion.188 While conceding this criticism, Meltzer argued that such discretion is
an “inescapable”189 part of preemption jurisprudence, due to “the limited capacity
of the legislature to prescribe, ex ante, a specific and comprehensive set of statutory
directives.”190 Because Congress simply cannot foresee what laws will be enacted
at the state level and what circumstances will arise so as to require preemption, the
text of federal statutes cannot control the inquiry.191 According to Meltzer, a court
must always engage in a purposive inquiry, whereby the court examines whether its
understanding of the federal law’s purpose would be undermined by the state law
in question because, for Meltzer, it is the job of the courts “to integrate federal
legislation with state and local bodies of law so as to craft a working and effective
legal order.”192
Moreover, pointing to the complexity of lawmaking in a horizontally and vertically
diffused polity—a complexity that Meltzer experienced firsthand through his work in
the Obama Administration193—Meltzer rejected Nelson’s analogy between repeals and
preemption.194 For Meltzer, repeals and preemption are entirely different doctrines, re-
quiring entirely different notions of consistency, because they operate in vastly different
legal contexts, with the repeals doctrine involving the same level of government, and
preemption being much more complicated, involving the relationship between the fed-
eral government and the fifty state governments, including their many sub-entities.195
This is a profound argument, with deep implications not just for preemption but
for how we think of consistency as a legal concept. Under Meltzer’s view, legal con-
sistency is not an abstract logical concept but rather a concrete functional tool, operating
186 Id. at 7.
187 Nelson, supra note 2, at 263.
188 Meltzer, supra note 17, at 7, 42–43.
189 Id. at 7.
190 Id. at 56.
191 Id. at 56–57.
192 Id. at 57.
193 In 2009, Obama appointed Meltzer as his principal deputy counsel. Charlie Savage, White
House Deputy Counsel Resigns, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (May 7, 2010, 4:40 PM), http://
thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/white-house-deputy-counsel-resigns/ [https://perma
.cc/3E6Z-NVNF]. Although Meltzer served in that capacity for only a little more than a year,
he was closely involved in many of the Administration’s efforts, including being “a player
in the White House’s effort to shepherd the health care overhaul through Congress[.]” Id.
194 Meltzer, supra note 17, at 49.
195 Id. at 51–52.
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differently in different legal contexts.196 Preemption jurisprudence must therefore
look to the function of the doctrine, and not to any abstract formal commands of
logic, in seeking to render a federal system of government that works, an approach
that might bear on how we think about related legal doctrines, such as stare decisis,
and indeed the rule of law in general.
One would be remiss to overlook the strong jurisprudential and political implica-
tions here: Functional critiques tend to come from the left and to favor much of the
Court’s preemption case law, whereas formalist critiques tend to come from the right
and to find the Court’s preemption doctrine in need of a massive overhaul.197 Perhaps
not surprisingly, when functionalist critiques have sought to reform the Court’s pre-
emption framework, they have taken aim at the Court’s impossibility analysis under
conflict preemption, which is of course the core of what scholars like Nelson and
Gardbaum seek to preserve by equating the Supremacy Clause with consistency.198
A significant problem with these functionalist proposals is that they overlook
how, as preemption doctrine has moved further away from the relatively straightfor-
ward question of consistency, and toward a more fact-specific approach, the Court’s
decision-making has become more complicated, more ideological, and consequently,
more favorable to displacement of state law, at least when it serves the ideological
196 See id. at 56.
197 Indeed, most functional critiques are not interested in completely reforming the doctrine,
in the way that Gardbaum and Nelson are, but rather in preserving the Court’s four-part frame-
work while simply orienting courts toward a more factually driven and pragmatic approach that
takes into consideration which types of state policies play a healthy role in our polity and
therefore should be preserved. Id. at 38 (“Implied preemption doctrine . . . is the means by
which . . . the national government can displace state law that ‘the legislature would wish to
be negatived.’” (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 27 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911))).
198 Consider, for example, Professor Leslie Kendrick’s recent proposal to eliminate impos-
sibility preemption on the ground that the analysis is excessively formalistic and therefore
“impossible” to apply. Leslie Kendrick, The Impossibility of Impossibility Preemption,
TORTSPROF BLOG (Mar. 17, 2003), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/2013/03
/leslie-kendrick-the-impossibility-of-impossibility-preemption.html [https://perma.cc/47KV
-ZCFG] [hereinafter Kendrick, Impossibility Preemption]. Kendrick contends that the only
way to fix preemption law is to make it “a question not of formalism but of facts on the
ground.” Id. Accordingly, Kendrick’s solution to the FDA/tort law conflict is to balance the
deterrent benefits of imposing state tort liability on drug manufacturers, against the potential
costs that tort liability would impose—namely, how it might “cause drug manufacturers to
raise prices to unaffordable levels, stop developing new products, or withdraw from the
market entirely.” Id. Under this proposal, the formal normative content of the relevant federal
and state legal prescriptions, and the logical relationship between these prescriptions, would
be entirely subordinate to Kendrick’s pragmatic cost-benefit analysis. See also Leslie C.
Kendrick, FDA’s Regulation of Prescription Drug Labeling: A Role for Implied Preemption,
62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 227 (2007).
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interests of the majority of the Court.199 This is why Meltzer’s and Leslie Kendrick’s
proposals are so problematic: Proposals to make preemption law even more func-
tional and less formalistic would only exacerbate this problem.
This should not be a political issue. Both liberals and conservatives alike should
be concerned about the Court continuing its functionalist approach to preemption,
given the doctrinal chaos and ideological conflict it has yielded in this area of law.
At this point, both sides have experienced the drawbacks of such an approach. The
solution is not to expand judicial discretion further, as Professors Meltzer and Kendrick
prescribe. The solution is rather to move preemption in the opposite direction: to expur-
gate such fact-driven policy concerns from the preemption framework and develop
a stronger theory of how to make preemption better work as a guarantee of consis-
tency between federal and state law. Part III will seek to develop such a solution.
III. MY PROPOSAL: PREEMPTION AS A CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE
My proposal will consist of four different steps. Section III.A will build on
Professor Nelson’s argument that preemption is analogous to repeals doctrine; this
Section will argue more broadly that preemption is one of many legal doctrines
designed to ensure systemic consistency—what I will call “consistency doctrines.”
Section III.B will argue that because these consistency doctrines require a theory of
consistency, we can understand the four branches of preemption more broadly in
terms of different theories of consistency, theories that have appeared in other
debates over consistency doctrines. Section III.C, drawing from other consistency
doctrines, as well as works in formal logic, will argue why one particular conception
of consistency—a normative conception—is the best fit for preemption doctrine.
Finally, Section III.D will derive the following preemption test from literature on
when legal norms impose conflicting obligations: Courts must rule that federal law
displaces state law if, and only if, the normative content expressed in the federal and
state laws impose conflicting obligations—either through legal prohibitions, require-
ments, or rights—on legal subjects.
A. The Three Modalities of Legal Consistency
As Caleb Nelson has so insightfully observed, preemption operates like statutory
repeals and is therefore not unique in law.200 What Nelson has overlooked, however, is
that this goes beyond the repeals doctrine. Preemption and repeals are what I will call
“consistency doctrines”—any legal doctrine designed to create systemic consistency.
We can break consistency doctrines into three modalities of legal consistency—turning
on when the laws were passed, who passed the laws, and what types of laws are at
199 See supra Section I.B.5.
200 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 231.
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issue. I will therefore call these the temporal,201 institutional,202 and typological203
modalities of legal consistency. Below is a table featuring the three types of consis-
tency modalities, alongside some of the most significant consistency doctrines falling
under these modalities.
Temporal Modality Institutional Modality Typological Modality
Repeals Doctrine Preemption Doctrine The Marbury Doctrine
Horizontal Stare Decisis Vertical Stare Decisis The Chevron Doctrine
Notice how these are all versions of the same problem: They all involve sorting
out how a legal system should deal with rules violating other rules within the same
system. In most areas of law, we think of specific actions as violating legal rules. For
example, to determine whether I violated the speed limit by committing the act of
driving over 65 MPH, we simply need a theory of how that particular rule (no driving
over 65 MPH) should apply to the facts (I drove over 65 MPH). A related, but slightly
different, legal question arises when legal rules violate other legal rules within the
same system. In seeking to resolve such conflicts, these consistency doctrines all
raise the same question: What does it mean for two laws to be inconsistent with one
another, so that one rule prevails over the other? All consistency doctrines therefore
require conceptions or theories of what constitutes a contradiction between rules.
201 Temporal consistency doctrines reconcile conflicts between norms issued by the same
institution at different times. This is a when issue: One law prevails over another because of
the time when it was passed. In the legislative sphere, conflicts between statutes passed at
different times are resolved through the canons of construction dealing with repeals—
specifically, leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (the “last in time” rule). See, e.g.,
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 160 n.3 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Conflicts between judicial decisions issued at different times within the same court are
resolved through horizontal stare decisis. See generally Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in
the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787 (2012) (providing an overview of
the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis).
202 Institutional consistency doctrines reconcile conflicts between norms issued by insti-
tutions situated differently within a legal system’s hierarchy. This is a who issue: One norm
prevails over another due to the entity or institution responsible for its promulgation. Pre-
emption and vertical stare decisis are two examples of doctrines that resolve conflicts based
on institutional authority.
203 Typological consistency doctrines reconcile conflicts between norms situated differently
within the typology of law, regardless of what institution adopted the respective legal norms.
This is a what issue: One norm prevails over another, not necessarily because the federal
government issued it, but because of what type of law it is. For example, under the Marbury
doctrine, the U.S. Constitution prevails over federal statutes and treaties, and under the
Chevron doctrine, both of these forms of federal law prevail over federal administrative
regulations. For further discussion of the relationship between Chevron and Marbury, see PHILIP
HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 309–21 (2014).
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B. The Four Preemption Branches as Four Conceptions of Consistency
The four preemption branches reflect four different theories of consistency that
can apply to any consistency doctrine. One, we could have a normative conception
of consistency—i.e., one that looks only to whether the normative content inhering
in the conflicting rules pulls an agent in opposing directions. Two, we can have a
purposive conception of consistency—i.e., one that looks to whether the purpose of
the superior authority’s rule would be undermined by the inferior authority’s rule.
Three, we can have a jurisdictional conception of consistency—i.e., one that considers
whether the authority of a sovereign’s control within a particular category of regu-
lation would be compromised through another sovereign’s presence in that area.
Finally, we can have an intentional conception of consistency—i.e., one that considers
only the intent of the superior sovereign in determining how to deal with that particu-
lar conflict. These distinctions among the different types of consistency are signifi-
cant because, as we will see in Section III.C, only the first type, the normative
conception of consistency, can be subject to formal logic’s law of non-contradiction.
Whereas norms can contradict one another logically, by pulling an agent in opposing
directions, that is not the case for purposes,204 jurisdictions,205 and intentions.206
Therefore, if we want to apply the law of non-contradiction to ensure that the system
is consistent, we will want to look only to the content of the norms. To illustrate how
these conceptions of consistency relate, let us step back from the preemption context
and see how the different theories apply to religious-liberty disputes, which require a
consistency doctrine because these disputes raise the institutional modality in that they
involve two competing institutions: a religious body and the government.207
204 Indeed, we say that purposes hang or fit together, to form a coherent whole, but if they
fail to cohere, they do not necessarily contradict one another as a logical matter. Some
scholars therefore refer to this purposive consistency as “normative coherence,” which is of
a functional nature, as distinct from “normative consistency,” which is of a logical nature.
Neil MacCormick, Coherence in Legal Justification, in THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE 235, 235
(Aleksander Peczenik et al. eds., 1984).
205 If encroaching on another sovereign’s jurisdiction violated the law of non-contradiction,
then it would also be the case that state violations of the Dormant Commerce Clause constitute
not just legal violations but logical contradictions as well. Conversely, the federal govern-
ment’s violations of the Tenth Amendment would also constitute logical contradictions by enter-
ing the state’s exclusive field. And the same for congressional usurpations of executive authority:
They would not simply be violations of the separation of powers but also logical contradictions.
206 Intentions do not logically contradict one another if the intentions do not form the
content of a norm. For example, if Congress says it has intent X through Y law, and a state
legislature says it intends to defeat Congress’s intent by enacting the same law, there is no
contradiction because the norm will require the same action of any agent subject to the two
laws. That the state legislature intended to contradict Congress by enacting the law does not
mean that there is a contradiction. The intent does not matter. All that matters, in terms of
there being a contradiction, is what the applicable norms actually require.
207 Indeed, the command to “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the
things that are God’s[,]” attributed to Jesus in Matthew 22:21 (ESV), can be understood as
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1. Example One: Church-State Law and Consistency Conceptions
Just as preemption doctrine makes the federal government the institutionally su-
perior sovereign whose norms prevail over contrary norms issued by inferior sovereigns
(the states), the Court’s pre–Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith208 interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause,209 and its post-Smith
interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)210 make a person’s
religious beliefs the institutionally superior sovereign in the event of an inconsistency
between those beliefs and a law.211 More specifically, to trigger strict scrutiny under
the pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause, and now under RFRA, the religious individual
bringing the suit must show that her religious beliefs were “substantially burden[ed]”
by the law being challenged.212 This standard is a consistency doctrine because it means
that, for strict scrutiny to apply, the individual must show a certain type of inconsistency
between her beliefs and the law. The “substantial burden” test thus raises the question,
analogous to the one raised in preemption cases, of what it means for two things to
contradict each other, such that the norm issued by the superior sovereign (the religious
belief) displaces the norm issued by the inferior sovereign (the government).
Which conception of consistency has the Court employed in church-state law?
Overwhelmingly, the Court has applied a normative conception, holding that under
the pre-Smith understanding of the Free Exercise Clause, and under the text of
RFRA, strict scrutiny applies if, and only if, some norm in her religion requires the
performance or non-performance of some act that the challenged law forbids or
a consistency doctrine—i.e., as a way to reconcile the norms of two overlapping but inde-
pendently sovereign systems.
208 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the application
of an Oregon drug law and thus the state could deny claimants unemployment compensation
based on drug-related misconduct).
209 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
210 RFRA was passed in 1993 to restore the Court’s pre-Smith religious-liberty standard, in
light of Congress’s disapproval of the Smith decision. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
512–16 (1997). In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court invalidated RFRA as applied to the states,
for exceeding Congress’s Article I and Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 powers. Id. at 536. But
the Court has since affirmed that RFRA reinstates the pre-Smith standard as applied to the federal
government. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–61
(2014) (holding that RFRA prohibited the contraceptive mandate under the Affordable Care Act
as applied to a for-profit corporation because the mandate imposed a substantial burden on its
closely held shareholders, and the mandate did not satisfy RFRA’s least-restrictive means re-
quirement); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–37
(2006) (holding that RFRA prohibited the federal government from banning a religious sect’s
use of hoasca because the ban imposed a substantial burden on the sect, and the federal
government lacked a compelling interest in the ban so as to justify that substantial burden).
211 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (stating that the only justification for an
individual’s constitutional right of free exercise is the government’s compelling state interest
in preventing the action).
212 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767 (quoting Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), b (2012)).
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requires.213 A good example of the Court’s application of this normative conception
is Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,214 where the Court held that
the federal government’s decision to build a road through the Chimney Rock area
of the Six Rivers Forest did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even though the
road “would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an
integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest California
Indian peoples.”215 The Court’s principal reason for rejecting this claim—despite the
powerful, empathic reasons favoring the claimants—was that the federal govern-
ment’s building of the road would not prohibit the claimants from following any
norms required of their religion.216 To be sure, the destruction of this forest would
make it more difficult for these Native Americans to practice their religious beliefs.217
But it would not make it impossible for them to do so.218 In other words, the Court
was adopting a normative conception of consistency, whereby a person’s religious
beliefs can displace her obligation to follow the law if, and only if, the person’s
religious beliefs and the controlling legal commands impose conflicting normative
obligations. Because this was not the case here, the Court rejected the claim.
In applying the substantial burden standard in this way, the Lyng Court resound-
ingly rejected competing conceptions of consistency. Indeed, while acknowledging that
its precedents, such as Sherbert, had invalidated laws that had simply imposed financial
burdens on religious exercise, the Court explained that these cases “cannot imply
that incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to
practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting
contrary to their religious beliefs, require government to bring forward a compelling
justification for its otherwise lawful actions.”219 Whereas a tax penalty or denial of gov-
ernment benefits can constitute a substantial burden on religious exercise under a nor-
mative conception of consistency, because these specific financial burdens amount
to normative prohibitions on specific conduct,220 the government’s destruction of a
forest used for religious rituals does not impose a substantial burden on religious
213 As the Court explained in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court’s canonical formulation of the
“substantial burden” standard, the government imposes a substantial burden on religious
belief when it “forces [an individual] to choose between [1] following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting [government] benefits . . . and [2] abandoning one of the precepts of
her religion [to obtain these benefits.]” 374 U.S. at 404. That is, there is a substantial burden
when a religious norm obligates a person to do precisely what the government obligates the
same person not to do (or vice versa).
214 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
215 Id. at 442 (internal quotation marks omitted).
216 Id. at 451–52.
217 Id. at 451.
218 See id. at 452.
219 Id. at 450–51.
220 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (holding that “to condition the avail-
ability of benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her
religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties”).
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exercise because it does not prohibit anything that the religion requires or vice versa.221
In holding that obstructing the functioning of a religious belief does not mean that the
government has imposed a substantial burden on that belief, the Court implicitly re-
jected a purposive conception of consistency. Likewise, the Court has rejected efforts
to use a jurisdictional conception, in which the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA would
create a complete barrier to the government’s entry into a religious domain,222 and the
Court has also repudiated an intentional conception by holding that it is the content
of the norms themselves, rather than the expressed will of the religious believer, that
governs the analysis.223
As the church-state context illustrates, a standard way of looking at consistency
in law is in terms of a normative conception. This does not mean, however, that the
other conceptions are not coherent ways of looking at consistency; to the contrary,
these other conceptions are entirely sensible and reasonable ways of looking at the
relationship between competing norms. But it may mean that these other concep-
tions do not fit as well with how consistency doctrines operate in our legal system.
To illustrate how broadly the normative consistency conception runs through our
legal system, let us consider briefly one more consistency doctrine, stare decisis.
2. Example Two: Stare Decisis Doctrine and Consistency Conceptions
As mentioned above, horizontal stare decisis raises the temporal consistency
modality (with later decisions overruling earlier, inconsistent decisions). Just as in
preemption, there is a dispute in stare decisis over whether the consistency required is
221 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451 (“The crucial word in the constitutional text is ‘prohibit.’”
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I)).
222 Indeed, when the Court has found jurisdictional barriers to governmental entry into a reli-
gious domain, it has been through the separation of religion and government under the Estab-
lishment Clause, not the guarantee of religious liberty under the Free Exercise Clause. See
generally Gregory A. Kalsheur, S.J., Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring
the Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 43, 55–69 (2008). Indeed, the Court has assiduously avoided finding
that religious liberty requires such categorical barriers and has instead interpreted religious
liberty to turn on the consistency between government enactments and individual beliefs.
By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise
Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith
and mission through its appointments. According the state the power
to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates
the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in
such ecclesiastical decisions.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 694,
706 (2012).
223 Cf. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (finding no substantial burden in the gov-
ernment’s assignment and use of a Native American child’s Social Security number because,
although the Court accepted the sincerity of the father’s belief that “use of [his daughter’s
Social Security] number may harm [her] spirit[,]” the government’s use “place[d] [no] restriction
on what [the father] may believe or what he may do”).
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of a functional or formal nature.224 Indeed, whereas in the preemption context a func-
tional approach asks whether the state law would pose an obstacle to the effectuation
of the federal purpose, in the stare decisis context a functional approach likewise
inquires whether “the decision poses a direct obstacle to the realization of important
objectives embodied in other laws[.]”225 And just how the formal approach in the
preemption context turns on whether it would be impossible to follow both federal and
state laws, a formal approach in the stare decisis context turns on whether “the later law
has rendered the [prior judicial] decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines
or policies[.]”226 Although there certainly are instances in which functional concep-
tion of consistency has been employed in stare decisis, the overwhelming tradition of
the practice and theory of stare decisis is for the deciding court to look only at the
content of the precedent decision to determine what norm would apply to the current
case and whether the deciding court’s preferred ruling would contradict that norm.227
This is what distinguishing a case, so as not to overrule the precedent, is based on—
the notion that the current ruling does not require something that the previous ruling
forbids, so that the two can jointly exist without requiring the trumping of one over
the other. In other words, if a judge can comply with both rulings, stare decisis requires
the preservation of both norms. When such joint compliance is not possible, how-
ever, then in the case of horizontal stare decisis the court must overrule the precedent
decision,228 and in the case of vertical stare decisis the court must follow the precedent,
so as not to rule according to what it believes to be the correct view of the law.229
Again, that stare decisis follows a normative consistency conception does not
necessarily mean that preemption law must also follow this approach to consistency.
But if we want a principled system, whereby preemption is governed by the same
conception of consistency prevailing in other areas of law, so that judges are not
simply picking and choosing when to displace state law on an ad hoc basis, the judicial
224 See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law, 7
OXFORD J.L. STUD. 215, 240 (1987).
225 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (citations omitted),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as
recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004).
226 Id. at 174.
227 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S.CAL.L.REV. 1, 17–19 (1989)
(articulating a model of precedent where formal rules require future conformity by other courts).
228 That is, the court must overrule itself if the standard that the court has imposed on itself
for overruling decisions has been satisfied. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (plurality opinion). But the threshold question, before that standard
is even an issue, is whether the purportedly correct ruling in the present case would require
following a legal norm that would have been forbidden by the precedent case.
229 This is of course because vertical stare decisis is an absolute command, always requiring
a lower court to follow the precedent of a higher court, regardless of its consistency with what
the lower court believes the law would require without that precedent. See Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct
application . . . the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls[.]”).
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practices in stare decisis and church-state law provide powerful arguments for treating
preemption accordingly. An additional reason lies in the relationship between norma-
tive consistency and formal logic, a point alluded to above but that will be explored
in greater depth in Section III.C.
C. Normative Consistency and Deontic Logic
Professor Michael Steven Green asked, almost ten years ago now, “Why don’t
American philosophers of law talk about deontic logic?”230 The neglect of deontic logic
(the species of formal logic dealing with norms) in legal theory is certainly puzzling.231
Even more puzzling, however, is this neglect in preemption scholarship. That is, why
has Professor Nelson, in developing his logical contradiction test, entirely ignored the
precise form of logic designed to apply the law of non-contradiction to norms? More-
over, why have all of the commentators on his test made this same mistake? Below,
we will seek to fill this void.
There are many versions of deontic logic,232 but under the logical scheme that
most deontic logicians follow, there are five deontic modalities or statuses.233 Most
deontic logicians define these five modalities according to their relationship to the
obligation modality, making the obligation modality what logicians call the “basic
operator.”234 From these five modalities, logicians have derived the following founda-
tional theorem of deontic logic: It is not the case that an agent can be obligated to
230 Michael Steven Green, Why No Deontic Logic?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 12, 2007,
4:50 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/10/why-no-deontic-.html [https://
perma.cc/VS45-H5CC].
231 Over the last several years, however, there have been some applications of deontic
logic to law. See, e.g., PABLO E. NAVARRO & JORGE L. RODRÍGUEZ, DEONTIC LOGIC AND
LEGAL SYSTEMS (2014).
232 Here, I will rely principally on Paul McNamara’s excellent essay on deontic logic in
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See Paul McNamara, Deontic Logic, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 6, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic/ [https://
perma.cc/96FD-82W7] (substantive revision Apr. 21, 2010). For an introduction to deontic
logic, see Dagfinn Føllesdal & Risto Hilpinen, Deontic Logic: An Introduction, in BLACKWELL
GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 1–35 (Risto Hilpinen ed., 1971). The foundational work on the
subject is GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, NORM AND ACTION: A LOGICAL ENQUIRY (1963).
233 See Paul McNamara, Making Room for Going Beyond the Call, 105 MIND 415, 418–19
(1996). The five deontic modalities are: (1) it is obligatory that (represented as OB), (2) it
is permissible that (represented as PE), (3) it is impermissible that (represented as IM), (4)
it is omissible that (represented as OM), and (5) it is optional that (represented as OP).
McNamara, supra note 232, § 1.2.
234 McNamara, supra note 232, § 1.2. That is, an act is: (1) permissible if, and only if, there
is not an obligation not do that thing (PEp  ~OB~p), (2) impermissible if, and only if, there is
an obligation not to do that thing (IMp  OB~p), (3) omissible if, and only if, there is not an obli-
gation to do that thing (OMp  ~OBp), (4) optional if, and only if, there is neither an obligation
to do that thing, nor an obligation not to do that thing (OPp  (~OBp & ~OB~p)). Id.
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perform an action and obligated not to perform that same action.235 In legal dis-
course, if an agent is obligated to perform an action, we generally say that an act is
required, and if an agent is obligated not to perform that action, we generally say an
act is forbidden; so, applied to law, this theorem of deontic logic simply says that
a legal system cannot require and forbid the same act. This “no conflicting obligations”
theorem forms the core of what it means for norms to be consistent with one another.236
One of the more fascinating features of this foundational theorem of deontic
logic is that, long before the formal advent of deontic logic, many legal philosophers,
such as Bentham,237 Kant,238 and Kelsen,239 had intuited it as forming the bedrock of
235 This is represented as ~(OBp & OB~p). Id. § 1.4. For the proof, see id. § 1.4 n.9.
236 McNamara, supra note 233, at 419; see also Lars Lindahl, Conflicts in the Systems of
Legal Norms: A Logical Point of View, in COHERENCE AND CONFLICT IN LAW 39 (Bob Brouwer
et al. eds., 1992).
237 That Bentham, the father of legal positivism in many ways, found a requirement of
logical consistency as inherent to a legal system is quite striking, and has been overlooked
by many legal theorists. But indeed, Bentham made such an argument in his Of Laws in General,
which, despite its significance, has been largely ignored, partly because for more than 150
years it remained unpublished, as it lay among 172 boxes of manuscripts that Bentham left
to University College, London, upon his death in 1832. H.L.A. HART, Bentham’s Of Laws
in General, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY
105, 107 (1982). Bentham’s literary executor, Sir John Bowring, had overlooked the manuscript,
and it was not discovered until the 1940s. Id. Charles Everett, of Columbia University, was
responsible for resuscitating the work and eventually publishing an edited version in 1945.
Id. Hart found this work of Bentham’s exceptionally important, even going so far as to claim
that, had it been published in Bentham’s lifetime, it would have been Bentham, rather than
his student, John Austin, who would have become known as the founder of analytical legal
philosophy. Id. at 108. One of the most important features of Of Laws in General is
Bentham’s effort to create a new terminology capturing the linguistic resources available to
a legislative body. See id. at 106–07. In doing so, he identified three distinct types of legal
norms—command, prohibit, and permit norms—and applied the law of non-contradiction
to these norms to derive the theorem that a legal system cannot command and prohibit the
same act. Id. at 112–14. For an excellent discussion of Bentham’s contributions to deontic
logic, see LARS LINDAHL, POSITION AND CHANGE: ASTUDY IN LAW AND LOGIC 3–21 (1977).
238 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS: WITH
ON A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE BECAUSE OF PHILANTHROPIC CONCERNS 6:223 (James W.
Ellington trans., 3d ed. 1993) (1785) (questioning the notion of “permissive laws,” as op-
posed to “laws that command and prohibit,” because law means duty and “[a]n action that
is neither commanded nor prohibited is merely permitted, since there is no law limiting one’s
freedom (one’s authorization) with regard to it, and so too no duty”).
239 In particular, Kelsen held that “[j]ust as it is logically impossible to assert both ‘A is,’
and ‘A is not,’ so it is logically impossible to assert both ‘A ought to be’ and ‘A ought not
to be.’” KELSEN, supra note 182, at 374–75; see also HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE
PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans.,
1992) (1934). For a rebuttal of Kelsen’s argument against conflicting obligations, see LON
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 66 (2d ed. 1969) (claiming that if a legal system consisted
of conflicting obligation norms, the legal system would fail as a moral matter because it
would fail “to build up a system of rules for the governance of . . . conduct,” but in failing
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all legal systems. For our purposes here, their legal intuitions are just as important,
and perhaps even more important, than the elaborate proofs that logicians have used
to derive this theorem from deontic axioms. The intuitions of such legal luminaries
powerfully signify that a rule against conflicting obligations lies at the core of how
we conceive of and effectuate consistency in law.
With this background in deontic logic and its “no conflicting obligations” theorem
covered, we can now see more clearly what this all has to do with preemption, and
indeed consistency doctrines in general. If we apply this theorem to preemption,240
we get exactly what the Court’s direct conflict test holds: The same act must be required
and prohibited for there to be a physical impossibility, and therefore preemption,
under this test.241 And indeed, just as Bentham, Kant, and Kelsen intuited this theorem
in this moral endeavor, the legal system would not “have trespassed against logic”); see also
H.L.A. HART, Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 309 (1983).
240 We should note here that although there is significant debate among moral philosophers
and logicians on the challenges of applying this theorem of deontic logic to normative systems,
none of these challenges is applicable to its application in preemption law, because unlike in
moral systems, our legal system has a specific provision, the Supremacy Clause, telling us ex-
actly how to deal with conflicts—that is, the Supremacy Clause makes every state law a
defeasible obligation, subject to displacement if it contradicts a federal law. McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819) (“The laws of the United States, then, made
in pursuance of the Constitution are to be the supreme law of the land, anything in the laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”). That is arguably not the case with moral
systems. Edward John Lemmon famously challenged the conflicting-obligations theorem on
this ground. See E. J. Lemmon, Moral Dilemmas, 71 PHIL. REV. 139, 148–50 (1962). To
illustrate Lemmon’s criticism, McNamara offers the following conflict between (1) “It is
obligatory that I now meet Jones (say, as promised to Jones, my friend)” and (2) “It is
obligatory that I now do not meet Jones (say, as promised to Smith, another friend).”
McNamara, supra note 232, § 4.4. McNamara points out that these two propositions create
a logical contradiction under standard deontic logic; indeed, the propositions violate the basic
theorem that there cannot be an obligation to perform x action and not perform x action. Id.
The problem, however, is that such conflicts are pervasive in normative systems and they
“hardly seem[ ] logically incoherent.” Id. The most famous example is of course Sartre’s
essay, Existentialism Is a Humanism, where Sartre used one of his students as an example
of how we must choose our moral commitments, because they are not given to us by nature.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism, in EXISTENTIALISM FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO
SARTRE 287–311 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., Meridian Books 1956). According to
Sartre’s telling of the story, the student felt obligated by his sense of morality to join the Free
French Forces in England in hopes of freeing his country from Nazi rule and avenging the
death of his elder brother, whom the Nazis had killed in the 1940 invasion of France. Id. at
295–96. But the student also felt obligated by his sense of morality to stay in France with his
mother, who, after being abandoned by the father and losing her oldest son in the war, de-
pended on the student as her sole source of comfort and happiness. Id. The student thus felt
both required and forbidden to go to England to join the Forces, and both required and
forbidden to stay in France to care for his mother. Id.
241 The paradigmatic example is of course from Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v.
Paul, Inc., where the Court first announced the impossibility test in explaining that there
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without the formal axioms of deontic logic, many legal scholars and judges have done
the same with preemption law. As mentioned above, Professor Gardbaum intuited
the notion that the impossibility analysis is the only preemption test warranted by
viewing the Supremacy Clause as a guarantee of federal-state consistency because
“the general concept of a ‘conflict of laws’ suggests that irreconcilability or contradic-
tion and not mere interference is necessary before a state law is displaced.”242 Here,
Gardbaum, without any explanation beyond the quoted passage, argued that only a
conflict of obligations constitutes a “contradiction” in the preemption context.
Even scholars adopting a more functional approach have slipped into this way
of thinking about legal contradictions. Consider, for example, Laurence Tribe’s ex-
cellent presentation of preemption law, as it stood in 1988, in his influential treatise,
American Constitutional Law.243 In explaining why the Supreme Court has devel-
oped obstacle preemption, Tribe wrote,
[S]tate and federal laws need not be contradictory on their face
for the latter to supersede the former: there are more subtle forms
of actual conflict. Even if state action does not go so far as to pro-
hibit the very acts that federal government requires (or vice versa),
it may nonetheless be struck down if it is in “actual conflict” with
narrow objectives that underlie relevant federal enactments.244
By equating obligation conflicts with contradictions, and using scare quotes to signify
that purposive conflicts are not quite “actual conflicts,” Tribe seemed to be taking
the position that only obligation conflicts—i.e., in preemption parlance “impossibil-
ity conflicts”—amount to logical contradictions in preemption law.245 That someone
like Hans Kelsen, a strong formalist, would take such a position on legal consistency
is not a surprise, but that Tribe, a liberal realist who has specifically argued against
applying logical commands to law,246 would make such an argument signifies just
how deeply rooted this notion is in our concept of law.
Turning back to Nelson’s logical contradiction test, we can now see a major
flaw in his use of logic to describe how his test works. Without directly engaging
would be preemption “if, for example, the federal orders forbade the picking and marketing
of any avocado testing more than 7% oil, while the California test excluded from the State
any avocado measuring less than 8% oil content.” 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).
242 Gardbaum, Congress’s Power, supra note 14, at 63–64.
243 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988).
244 Id. § 6-26, at 482 (footnote omitted).
245 See id. § 6-26, at 482 n.8.
246 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CON-
STITUTION 24 (1991) (“The notion that the Constitution embodies an immanent, unitary,
changeless set of underlying values or principles . . . seems an extraordinary intellectual
conceit . . . .”).
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with deontic logic literature—or any literature on logic for that matter—Nelson argues
that federal-state conflicts that do not create conflicting obligations nevertheless
create logical contradictions.247 For example, going against the current of what many
of our greatest legal minds have said about legal consistency, Nelson argues through-
out his article that if state law authorizes X action, and federal law prohibits that
action, then there is a logical contradiction.248 Although this prohibition-permission
conflict would not seem to create a logical contradiction, given that a legal subject
could follow both the federal and state laws by simply not engaging in the action
authorized under state law, such a scenario might present a practical contradiction,
or what von Wright referred to as “Sysphos-orders,” in that the state authorization
would undermine the federal prohibition, as was the case with Zeus’s dueling but
not contradictory orders to Sisyphus.249 In the parlance of the Court’s preemption
doctrine, a state permission norm that undermined but did not directly conflict with
a federal prohibition norm would be preempted, but not under the Court’s direct con-
flict analysis, but rather under the Court’s indirect conflict analysis.250 Nelson’s argu-
ment about applying his logical contradiction test to permission-prohibition conflicts
therefore includes precisely the type of practical conflicts that logicians and legal
theorists have found not to be of a logical status, but of a functional status—which
is, ironically, precisely the type of conflict that Nelson seeks to exclude from his
preemption framework.
247 Nelson, supra note 2, at 261.
248 For example, Nelson states the following rule:
If state law purports to authorize something that federal law forbids or
to penalize something that federal law gives people an unqualified right
to do, then courts would have to choose between applying the federal
rule and applying the state rule, and the Supremacy Clause requires
them to apply the federal rule.
Id. Likewise, Nelson offers the following hypothetical: “Imagine, for instance, that a valid
rule of federal law gives workers the right to join a labor union (subject to certain qualifica-
tions), while state law purports to prohibit all union membership.” Id. Because it would be
“physically possible for workers to comply with both laws by refraining from joining a
union[,]” his hypothetical set of laws would satisfy the Supreme Court’s direct conflict test.
Id. Nevertheless, he concludes, this conflict would violate the “logical contradiction” test,
because “[a] court that enforced the state-law prohibition would be ignoring the federal-law
right.” Id.
249 VON WRIGHT, supra note 232, at 147. Indeed, although Zeus seemed to contradict
himself by commanding Sisyphus to roll the boulder up the hill while also commanding the
boulder to roll down the hill each time before Sisyphus could reach the top, these commands
were not actually contradictory, as a logical matter, because these commands operated at
different times. The dueling commands rendered Sisyphus’s compliance inefficacious, but
the commands were nonetheless logically consistent, because it was possible to comply with
the dueling commands. Sisyphus could simply roll the boulder up the hill, and then, once the
boulder rolled back down, retrieve it to roll it up again, ad infinitum. See id.
250 See TRIBE, supra note 243, § 6-26, at 482 n.7.
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To illustrate how Nelson’s application of his logical contradiction test resembles
the functional approaches covered in Part II, consider Nelson’s argument challeng-
ing the conventional interpretation of McCulloch as being a precursor of “obstacle
preemption.”251 In making this argument, Nelson claims that Maryland’s taxing a bank
that the federal government had specifically authorized to act within the state created
an actual logical contradiction between federal and state law, thereby violating his
logical contradiction test.252 Nelson claims that this conclusion can be reached in two
ways—in either “substantive” or “jurisdictional” terms.253 In finding a “substantive”
logical contradiction, Nelson emphasizes how the Court later established in Osborn
v. Bank of the United States254 that the federal statute at issue in McCulloch did not
simply create the United States Bank but also “authorize[d] its Banking operations,”
such as its issuing of bank notes.255 Under this interpretation of the statute, Nelson
concludes that “a state law purporting to prevent the Bank from issuing bank notes
(unless it paid a tax on each note or gave the state $15,000 a year) would contradict
this substantive license.”256 Nelson seems to be arguing here that whenever federal law
specifically licenses an action, any state impediment imposed on the performance
of that action logically contradicts the federal law. Alternatively, Nelson argues, one
can find a “jurisdictional” logical contradiction in McCulloch by “interpret[ing] the
federal statute chartering the Bank to occupy a particular field and to deprive the states
of what Marshall called ‘controling power’ over the Bank’s operations.”257 Here,
Nelson seems to be arguing that if federal law authorizes an entity to act within a
certain field, then any state law regulating that entity, regardless of the substantive
content of the state regulation, creates a logical contradiction with the federal law.
Although it is clear why the former creates a substantive conflict and the latter
a jurisdictional conflict, it is not clear why either of these substantive and jurisdic-
tional conflicts amounts to a logical contradiction. Because a law licensing or authoriz-
ing an entity does not create an obligation on other parties to honor its existence—an
issue we will explore in greater depth shortly in Section III.D—Nelson is wrong in
concluding that if we treat Maryland’s tax as “prevent[ing] the Bank from issuing
bank notes[,]” the tax “would contradict [the Bank’s] substantive license.”258 The
Maryland tax surely would pose an obstacle to the Bank’s exercise of its privilege, just
251 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 266–72.
252 See id. at 269–72.
253 Id. at 271. Nelson also considers a third option—that McCulloch was decided not on
preemption grounds but rather on the “structural principles in the Constitution establish[ing]
a doctrine of intergovernmental immunities[.]” Id. at 269. But Nelson considers two options
for interpreting McCulloch as a preemption case. Id. at 269–72.
254 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
255 Nelson, supra note 2, at 270 (alteration in original) (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
at 861).
256 Id. at 271.
257 Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819)).
258 Id.
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as states taxing federal gun permits or federal marijuana licenses would obstruct the
exercise of such privileges; for this reason, the Court and commentators have rightfully
defended McCulloch on the basis of obstacle preemption. But such a tax on a privilege
does not pose a logical contradiction, and therefore does not warrant preemption
under a Supremacy Clause test that tracks the meaning of logical contradictions.
Likewise, Nelson errs in claiming that we can find a jurisdictional logical con-
tradiction in McCulloch simply by “interpret[ing] the federal statute chartering the
Bank to occupy a particular field and to deprive the states of what Marshall called
‘controling power’ over the Bank’s operations.”259 Just as Nelson’s substantive con-
flict argument is essentially an obstacle preemption claim, Nelson’s jurisdictional con-
flict argument is simply field preemption dressed up as a logical contradiction. If the
federal statute at issue in McCulloch did indeed “deprive the states of what Marshall
called ‘controling power’ over the Bank’s operations,” then Maryland simply lacked
the authority to regulate those operations.260 And this is because of the content of the
federal statute chartering the Bank, not because of any rule of logic. As mentioned
above, a state that acts outside of its authority simply commits a legal violation.261
It does not transgress logic in the process.262
In a sense, however, Nelson’s test does comply with the deontic logic theorem
against conflicting obligations. He claims that logical contradictions arise whenever
“courts would have to choose between applying the federal rule and applying the
state rule, and the Supremacy Clause requires them to apply the federal rule.”263 In
other words, there is a logical contradiction in these instances because courts are
required and forbidden to apply both federal and state laws. In this sense, then, Nelson’s
conception of what constitutes a contradiction is grounded in deontic logic, though
Nelson does not use such terms.
But how can there be a conflict of obligations under such a scenario, when the
state law simply permits the conduct that the federal law prohibits, or when the fed-
eral law simply occupies the field jurisdictionally? The reason that Nelson is able
to frame these scenarios as conflicts of obligations is because Nelson focuses on courts
as the relevant agents, whereas the customary way of thinking of legal conflicts is
in terms of legal subjects—i.e., individuals subjected to the law’s commands.264 In
259 Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 433).
260 Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 433).
261 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
262 We should note that Nelson borrows this substantive-jurisdictional distinction from
Tribe’s treatise, TRIBE, supra note 243, § 6-25, at 481, but Tribe clearly did not think that
substantive purposive conflicts or jurisdictional conflicts constituted “actual conflicts” or
“logical contradictions.” Id. The only logical contradictions for Tribe are substantive norma-
tive conflicts—i.e., conflicts involving state laws that “prohibit the very acts that federal law
requires (or vice versa)[.]” Id. § 6-26, at 482.
263 Nelson, supra note 2, at 261.
264 Nelson makes this shift explicitly when distinguishing between the Court’s direct
conflict standard and his proposed logical contradiction test: “There are plenty of circum-
stances in which it is physically possible for individuals to comply with both state and federal
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Section III.D, we will explore how to apply the rule against conflicting obligations to
preemption law, focusing in particular on this issue of agency and how to determine
when laws impose conflicting obligations on legal subjects.
D. Applying the Rule Against Conflicting Obligations to Preemption Law
The problem with applying Nelson’s logical contradiction test to courts is that
whenever different federal and state laws apply to the same controversy, courts are
subject to competing choices.265 This is because the entirety of federal law is always
and necessarily assimilated into state law; indeed, that is the entire point of the
Supremacy Clause.266 So courts are always subject to conflicting choices whenever
there is any difference, of any magnitude, between applicable federal and state law.
Preemption is not designed to remove these conflicts, but only those that compel legal
subjects to choose between federal and state law. These are the agents that matter
for purposes of creating a consistent legal system.
1. Agency and Conflicting Obligations
Nelson’s argument ignores how pervasive such federal-state conflicts are in our
system and how the purpose of consistency doctrines is to ensure that legal subjects,
as opposed to courts, do not face conflicting commands. For example, Gonzales v.
law even though courts would have to choose between them—that is, even though state and
federal law contradict each other.” Id. at 260–61.
265 For example, in his union hypothetical, under which federal law creates a right to join
a union and state law prohibits it, an employee can logically satisfy both the federal and state
laws “by refraining from joining a union[,]” and therefore the state law should not be pre-
empted under the Court’s preemption doctrine. Id. at 261. Nelson points out, however, that
a court, unlike an employee, would not be able to satisfy both commands, because a court
would be compelled to choose between federal and state law in adjudicating a dispute
between an employer refusing to permit union organizing and an employee seeking to join
a union. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 260–61. Because a court would face conflicting obligations,
the state law—under Nelson’s test, but not under the Supreme Court’s impossibility test—
would be preempted. A minor quibble with Nelson’s point here is that his hypothetical does
not actually support his argument. Under his own hypothetical, private agents (employers)
do face a physical impossibility: Employers are required to permit employees to join unions
under the federal law but forbidden to do so under state law. Nelson, however, treats his
hypothetical as a binary division between employees and courts, when, in reality, there are
other parties—namely, employers. Because a private agent does face a physical impossibility
in this scenario, the very standard Nelson is criticizing (the Court’s direct conflict test) would
produce the very conclusion Nelson believes to be right in this case (preemption of state law).
Thus, the public-private agent distinction does not seem to do any work in Nelson’s hypothetical.
That this distinction escapes Nelson underscores the confusion underlying his test.
266 See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 340–41 (1816).
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Raich267 involved a conflict between the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), making
the use and possession of all marijuana unlawful,268 and California Proposition 215,
making the use and possession of medical marijuana lawful,269 but the Court did not
even mention the possibility of the CSA preempting Proposition 215 in its opinion
holding that the Commerce Clause authorizes the CSA to apply within California
borders to the intrastate manufacture and use of medical marijuana.270 Likewise, con-
flicting federal and state minimum-wage laws point courts to reach different conclu-
sions in labor disputes, but no one thinks that the federal minimum wage preempts
the state minimum wage.271 Similarly, federal law forbids a person who uses a con-
trolled substance under the CSA to possess a firearm,272 but that law does not pre-
empt the authority of states to permit such possession.273 And no one has suggested
267 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
268 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(c), 841, 844 (2000).
269 Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West
Supp. 2005).
270 Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 22. Note that Raich is simply the reverse of Nelson’s union
hypothetical: Whereas in Nelson’s hypothetical, federal law permits what state law prohibits
(union organizing), in Raich federal law prohibited what state law permitted (medical
marijuana). But Raich was litigated only as an Article I case, raising only the question of
whether the federal government had the authority to prosecute the intrastate use and possession
of medical marijuana, id. at 5, not as a preemption case, which would have raised the
question of whether the CSA automatically displaced California’s authority to permit medical
marijuana. Why did no one think of this as a preemption case? The answer is simple: No
subject of these federal and state laws was obligated to perform conflicting actions. Angel
Raich, after all, was not obligated under state law to use and possess medical marijuana. For
this reason, federal law did not preempt state law. The federal government, to be sure, had
the authority to go after Angel Raich under the CSA, as the Court affirmed in its opinion. But
California law, in permitting medical marijuana, was not preempted by federal law. Indeed,
more than ten years after the decision, the medical marijuana industry in California is flourishing,
and similar state laws are permeating through the nation. See Marijuana Resource Center:
State Laws Related to Marijuana, OFF. NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/ondcp/state-laws-related-to-marijuana [https://perma.cc/58ZC-CLNX]
(explaining how “23 states and Washington, DC have passed laws allowing smoked marijuana
to be used for a variety of medical conditions[,]” and how “[v]oters in Alaska, Colorado,
Oregon, and Washington state [have] also passed initiatives legalizing the sale and distri-
bution of marijuana for adults”).
271 Indeed, were an employee to sue an employer in California court for paying her $9.00,
the court would have to choose between applying the federal and state minimum wage laws
to resolve the dispute, but there is no conflict imposed on private agents, because an em-
ployer that satisfies the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour is not prohibited under any
law from exceeding that amount to satisfy the California minimum wage of $10.00 per hour.
See generally Minimum Wage Laws in the States, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, WAGE & HOUR
DIVISION (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm [https://perma.cc
/3MU4-XQLJ].
272 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2012).
273 See, e.g., Willis v. Winters, 253 P.3d 1058, 1064–66 (Or. 2011) (rejecting the pre-
emption argument). For commentary on the decision’s preemption analysis, see Eugene
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that a U.S. Supreme Court decision interpreting the Equal Protection Clause274 to
permit some forms of affirmative action preempts state bans on all forms of affirma-
tive action,275 or that a U.S. Supreme Court decision interpreting the Establishment
Clause276 to permit the government to fund religious schools preempts state bans on
such funding.277
All of these cases are like Nelson’s hypothetical, in that they involve one sovereign
banning something permitted by the other, thereby requiring courts to choose between
federal and state laws in adjudicating the disputes. And all of these are controversial and
widely disputed areas of law, creating appealing preemption scenarios for various
shades of the political spectrum. Nevertheless, these federal-state conflicts have gen-
erally not been litigated as preemption cases, and when they have, the arguments have
been dismissed summarily, with no one raising the argument that there should be pre-
emption due to the fact that the courts would be subject to conflicting commands.278
Now that we have established that individuals rather than courts are the relevant
agents of the preemption analysis, we must determine when conflicting legal obliga-
tions arise from these commands, so as to warrant preemption of state law. To answer
this question, we will have to examine some legal philosophy on the status of rights.
2. Rights and Conflicting Obligations
The most important work on the concept of rights is still Wesley Hohfeld’s ground-
breaking 1913 work, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Volokh, Oregon Medical Marijuana Users Are Entitled to Oregon Licenses to Carry Con-
cealed Guns (Notwithstanding Federal Ban on Gun Possession by Illegal Drug Users),
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 19, 2011), http://volokh.com/2011/05/19/oregon-medical-mari
juana-users-are-entitled-to-oregon-licenses-to-carry-concealed-guns-notwithstanding-federal
-ban-on-gun-possession-by-illegal-drug-users/ [https://perma.cc/HRA6-JKN9].
274 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
275 Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause permitted the University of Michigan Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in
admissions decision to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that
flow from a diverse student body), with Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572
U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause permitted Michigan
to ban the type of affirmative action upheld in Grutter).
276 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion[.]”).
277 Compare Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding Ohio’s Pilot
Project Scholarship Program does not offend the Establishment Clause), with Bush v.
Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006) (holding that Florida’s Opportunity Scholarship Program
was impermissible under the state constitution, despite being permissible under the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause).
278 See Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, 332 P.3d 587, 591–92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); Qualified
Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 105–07 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Willis,
253 P.3d at 1064–66.
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Reasoning,279 where Hohfeld explored the relationships among eight legal concepts
that he identified as basic to any legal system: (1) right, (2) no-right, (3) privilege,
(4) duty, (5) power, (6) disability, (7) immunity, and (8) liability.280 The Hohfeldian
framework relates to preemption law in that it shows how rights function as a hybrid
of a permission and obligation norm: A right permits the right-holder to engage in
an action, but the right obligates legal subjects who must honor the right-holder’s
exercise of that right.281 By contrast, a privilege is only a permission norm: A privilege
creates a permission norm for the privilege-holder to engage in an action, but it carries
no obligations for any legal subjects.282
This is why the agency issue raised above is so important. Under Nelson’s test,
courts are the agents subject to logical contradictions. As a result, all conflicts between
privileges and prohibitions, just like conflicts between rights and prohibitions, would
warrant preemption of state law. This is because privileges and rights are identical in
obligating courts, as the arbiters rather than the subjects of law, to enforce permission
279 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
280 Id. at 30. Hohfeld separated these concepts into two categories: jural opposites and
jural correlatives. Id. Jural opposites cannot coexist for the same class of action at the same
time; a jural opposite is a negation of a corresponding legal concept. See id. By contrast, jural
correlatives consist of a pair of legal concepts that must coexist for the same class of action
at the same time; a jural correlative refers to a legal concept’s corresponding status that must
inhere in Party B so that it can exist for Party A. Id. at 32–33. This means that if Party A has
a right to perform x class of action, that right exists if, and only if, Party B has a duty to Party
A with respect to that action. Id. at 31–32. This will generally be enforced by a lawsuit
against B if B violates that duty. Alternatively, if Party A has a privilege to perform x class
of action, that privilege exists if, and only if, Party B has no right or duty to interfere with
Party A’s performance of that action. Id. at 32. This will often appear in law as an affirmative
defense; if A is sued by B for engaging in x class of action, A can assert an absolute defense
by pointing to his privilege. If Party A has a power (i.e., the capacity to create or change a
legal relationship), that power exists if, and only if, Party B has a liability. Id. at 44. For example,
courts have power over the legal status of subjects only because courts can enter judgements
that render the parties liable. Finally, if Party A has an immunity, that immunity exists if, and
only if, Party B has a disability. Id. at 55. For example, the states have sovereign immunity only
because courts are disabled from rendering judgments against them.
281 Id. at 32, 42 n.59.
282 Id. at 33. Consider, for example, the difference between property rights and driving
licenses. Because I own my car, I can sue for conversion if someone interfered with my ac-
cess to my car; all private parties have an obligation not to interfere with the exercise of my
property rights, which means that only in limited circumstances may they use or enter my
property without my consent. By contrast, no private party owes me a duty not to interfere
with my driving privileges. The State of Maryland, which issued my driving license, does
have a duty not to deprive me of my driving privileges, which means that it may deprive me
of my privileges only for certain circumscribed reasons. But no legal subject owes me any
duties in not interfering with the exercise of my driving privileges, as opposed to the duty
they owe me not to interfere with the exercise of my property rights in my car.
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norms. Under my proposed test, however, in which only conflicts of obligations gen-
erate logical contradictions within a normative system, and only the subjects of law
are the agents for whom federal and state law must be made consistent for preemption
purposes, the only type of permission norm that can generate a logical contradiction
is a right, not a privilege. This is because rights are the only permission norms that
impose obligations on other legal subjects.
This makes it critical, when analyzing whether there is a conflict of obligation
arising from a legal provision authorizing some form of conduct, to determine whether
we are dealing with a right or privilege. That is, we must determine whether the law
only authorizes an action (in which case it is just a privilege, and therefore never
warrants preemption) or also imposes obligations on other parties in the process (in
which case it is a right, and therefore warrants preemption if it conflicts with other
legal obligations). Part IV will illustrate how this will cash out doctrinally by applying
my proposed test to various hypothetical and real cases, and in the process highlight-
ing how my test differs from the Supreme Court’s direct conflict test, as well as other
leading proposals covered in Part II.
IV. DISTINGUISHING AND APPLYING MY PROPOSED NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY TEST
The test developed in this Article can be summarized in the following terms:
Federal law displaces state law under the Supremacy Clause if, and only if, the nor-
mative terms of the two laws impose conflicting obligations on the subjects of those
laws, either through legal prohibitions, requirements, or rights. The only source of
information relevant to whether there is such a conflicting obligation is the content
of the norms themselves. That content may be derived from multiple legal sources;
my approach does not adopt a view on statutory interpretation and, therefore, does
not necessarily exclude the use of legislative intent or purpose in determining the
content of a particular legal enactment. But once the content of a legal provision is
ascertained, that normative content is the only relevant information in determining
whether preemption is warranted under the Supremacy Clause. As we will see
below, this distinguishes my test from the other aforementioned accounts in several
important ways.
A. Distinguishing My Normative Consistency Test
My test most obviously differs from Nelson’s logical contradiction test. As a
matter of nomenclature, I have resisted making my proposal another logical contra-
diction test, opting instead to call my approach a “normative consistency” test. This
may be a bit counterintuitive, given that my test more closely follows formal logic
than does Nelson’s logical contradiction test. Nevertheless, I have resisted explicitly
calling my test a logical test because turning the analysis on logical commands
unnecessarily raises questions about why, how, and whether the dictates of formal
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logic should apply to legal enactments. For example, do non-normative conflicts,
such as definitional conflicts between federal and state law, also raise logical con-
tradictions? It would seem so.283 To avoid getting bogged down in such metaphysical
controversies, I have sought to follow how conflicts arise in other areas of positive
law, looking to formal logic only after finding the theorem against conflicting obliga-
tions expressed in various areas of legal practice and theory.284 The rule proposed in this
Article may comport with logic, but it is not commanded by logic. Indeed, my preemp-
tion rule is derived from positive law, and although it may ultimately be traceable to
logic, it surely is not commanded directly by logic as an independent field of inquiry.
For that reason, I have dubbed it a “normative consistency” test, as a test about the re-
lationship between norms, rather than a refinement of Nelson’s logical contradiction
test—a test about applying formal logic’s rule of non-contradiction to legal norms.
A more practical distinction between my test and Nelson’s logical contradiction
test is that my test looks to preemption as part of a set of consistency doctrines. As a
result, my test focuses only on obligations and applies only to legal subjects, whereas
Nelson quite differently considers whether dueling federal and state laws require courts
to make competing “choices.”285 This has a significant effect on how our approaches
would affect preemption doctrine. Accordingly, whereas Nelson’s choice-oriented ap-
proach preserves direct conflict, field, and express preemption, my norm-oriented ap-
proach preserves only direct conflict preemption, though in a slightly different form.
That raises the question of how my proposed test differs from the Court’s direct
conflict preemption analysis. The most important distinction is that my test focuses
only on whether the normative content of federal and state laws imposes conflicting
obligations on their subjects. The Court has differed in turning this test on the notion
of “impossibility.”286 As a result, any hypothetical scenario in which it would be
possible for some individual to comply with the two norms could render the state
law not preempted under the Court’s direct conflict analysis. This step of focusing
on hypothetical possibilities has divided the Justices,287 making the test, in Professor
283 Indeed, if federal law defined medical marijuana as a recreational drug and not an
actual form of medication, and state law defined it only as a form of medication, that very
well may constitute a logical contradiction, since the basic law of identity is that a thing
cannot have x quality and not have x quality. Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274–75
(2006) (holding that the Attorney General may not define certain drugs to be prohibited under
the Controlled Substances Act for the purpose of preventing doctors from using these drugs
in physician-assisted suicide pursuant to state law).
284 It is, to be sure, a fascinating question whether legal practices have tracked this theorem
because the dictates of logic guide our conceptions of law. But that is a theoretical question
outside the scope of this Article, which I have directed toward the practice, rather than the
theory, of law.
285 Nelson, supra note 2, at 231–32.
286 Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963); see also
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 626 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
287 As Justice Sotomayor argued in dissent, in one of the controversial 5–4 decisions men-
tioned above, “the mere possibility of impossibility is not enough” to establish preemption
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Kendrick’s words, “impossible to comply with.”288 For this reason, I have assidu-
ously referred to the consistency at the core of preemption as turning not on realms
of possibility but rather on the content of norms—it is not a possibility consistency
but rather a normative consistency.
Another important distinction between the Court’s direct conflict analysis and
my normative consistency test is I have contextualized my test within a broader set
of doctrines dealing with legal consistency, thus offering more guidance to courts
in ascertaining what constitutes a conflicting obligation. By using church-state law
as a guide, for example, we can determine that penalties on conduct can present con-
flicting obligations.289 Accordingly, if a subject has to choose between a penalty under
X federal requirement, and a penalty under Y state prohibition, that warrants preemp-
tion of the state law, because it presents conflicting obligations, even though it would
be theoretically possible to comply with both laws by simply paying one or both of
the penalties.290 Contextualizing preemption against the background of other consis-
tency doctrines helps stabilize and settle some of the difficult questions that arise in
all areas of law involving conflicting norms.
My proposal perhaps has the most in common with Gardbaum’s approach, to
which I am largely indebted for the link between the Supremacy Clause and legal
consistency. In essence, my approach simply puts meat on the bones of Gardbaum’s
claim that impossibility preemption is the only branch of the preemption tree war-
ranted by the Supremacy Clause.291 Another way to look at how this Article relates
to Gardbaum’s scholarship is that they are the converse of one another: Whereas
Gardbaum considers the precise contours of the direct conflict test to be outside the
scope of his project,292 I have made that the centerpiece of my work; and whereas
Gardbaum directly takes on the question of whether the other branches of the pre-
emption tree could and should be justified under other constitutional provisions
besides the Supremacy Clause,293 that is a question I leave for another day, though
I can say that I am tentatively more drawn than Gardbaum to the notion that substan-
tial parts of the preemption tree, though perhaps not in their entirety, can be justified
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
That leaves the final, and most important, question: How would these distinc-
tions play out in actual cases? In most cases, my normative consistency test, the
under the direct conflict analysis. PLIVA, Inc., 564 U.S. at 635 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Sotomayor, this test warrants preemption if, and only if, it would be
impossible under every imaginable scenario to comply with both federal and state law at the
same time. Id. at 634–37.
288 Kendrick, Impossibility Preemption, supra note 198.
289 See supra Section III.B.1.
290 See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
291 Gardbaum, Congress’s Power, supra note 14, at 44–48.
292 Id. at 61 n.95.
293 Gardbaum, Nature of Preemption, supra note 14, at 777–85 (discussing the Commerce
and Necessary and Proper Clauses).
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Court’s impossibility, and Nelson’s logical contradiction test will reach the same
results. But this will not always be the case. To illustrate where these approaches
will direct courts to reach different results, let us return to some of the examples we
have considered throughout this Article.
B. Applying My Normative Consistency Test
Let us reconsider Nelson’s union hypothetical involving a federal “right to join a
labor union” and a state prohibition on labor unions.294 Nelson does not seem to be
referring to a mere privilege to join a labor union but rather an affirmative right. This
distinction is significant because, as explained above, a privilege would not impose any
obligations on third parties, but a right would obligate employers not to enforce any
legal prohibitions on the exercise of that right. Only if Nelson’s union hypothetical in-
volves a federal right, and not a federal privilege, does it involve a conflict of obliga-
tions on legal subjects, with employers required under federal law to do what they are
prohibited from doing under state law, thereby giving rise to an actual logical contradic-
tion. Thus, if Nelson is referring to a right here, he is on firm footing in finding a
conflict of obligations on legal subjects, thus warranting preemption of state law.
In the next paragraph, however, Nelson loses this footing, obscuring the critical
logical distinction between rights and privileges by stating the following rule:
If state law purports to authorize something that federal law for-
bids or to penalize something that federal law gives people an
unqualified right to do, then courts would have to choose be-
tween applying the federal rule and applying the state rule, and
the Supremacy Clause requires them to apply the federal rule.295
Half of this statement is right: If state law penalizes something that federal law
gives people an unqualified right to do, then there is a logical contradiction, because
the state penalty would function as a prohibition norm forbidding anyone to partici-
pate in that action, and the federal right would function as a right requiring some
party to effectuate the exercise of that right, thereby imposing a conflict of obliga-
tions on that party.296 The other half, however, is not right: If a state law merely
authorizes something that federal law forbids, then there would be no logical con-
tradiction because the state law, in authorizing the action, would create only a
privilege and not require anything of another legal subject.
Consider the Wyeth case, raising the question of whether the FDA’s approval of a
drug label preempted a lawsuit under state law against the brand-name manufacturer
for failing to provide an adequate warning of the drug’s risks.297 The Court, per
294 Nelson, supra note 2, at 261.
295 Id.
296 Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
297 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558–59 (2009).
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Justice Stevens, ruled that the conflict between the FDA’s authorization of the label,
and the state’s damages award on the basis of that label, did not create an impossi-
bility conflict because a manufacturer could theoretically comply with the FDA
label while adding to that requirement in light of state jury determinations.298 This
reasoning is wholly consistent with the Court’s impossibility jurisprudence because
the drug manufacturer was not subject to a physical impossibility in being subject
to the FDA labeling requirements and the stronger state standard.
Would the state law be preempted, however, under my normative consistency test?
No, but for slightly different reasons. First, we would want to determine what type of
norm applied to the manufacturer under the FDA’s approval of the label. The FDA’s
authorization seems to create a privilege and not a right because while it grants the
drug manufacturer the authority to sell the drug with the approved label, it does not
appear to impose any obligations on any other parties in the process.299 Second, we
would want to determine what type of norm applied to the manufacturer under the state
jury award. Here, we would not be operating in a legal vacuum. We know from other
consistency doctrines that monetary penalties on conduct constitute prohibitions on
that conduct, so as to create inconsistencies if a countervailing norm requires the
performance of that conduct.300 We therefore have a state obligation but no counter-
vailing federal obligation. And as a result, there was no conflict of obligations im-
posed on Wyeth, and the Court was right in not preempting the state jury award.
Under Nelson’s test, however, the Court should have found preemption here.
Because Nelson does not distinguish between rights and privileges, and because he
focuses on courts as the agents of preemption analysis, the FDA’s label-approval cre-
ated precisely the conflict on courts that Nelson’s logical contradiction test prohibits.
Betraying the confusion underlying Nelson’s test, however, Justice Thomas ap-
plied Nelson’s logical contradiction test to concur with the majority that there was
no preemption here, despite the fact that Nelson’s test seemed to require the opposite
result.301 Indeed, reiterating Nelson’s argument almost verbatim, Justice Thomas
disagreed with the Court’s impossibility standard for direct conflicts, explaining that
“[t]here could be instances where it is not ‘physically impossible’ to comply with
both state and federal law, even when the state and federal laws give directly conflicting
commands.”302 Justice Thomas then offered an example, modeled after Nelson’s
union hypothetical: “[I]f federal law gives an individual the right to engage in certain
298 Id. at 581. Under the FDA’s “changes being effected” regulation, federal law permitted
the drug manufacturer to change the label to account for the risk at issue in this case. Id. at
568 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C)).
299 Id. at 568.
300 Indeed, just as a state jury award for participating in a religious ritual would constitute
a prohibition on that ritual, thereby satisfying the substantial burden test if the ritual were
commanded by the challenger’s religion, the same is the case for a drug manufacturer facing
state jury damages awards for conduct required by federal law.
301 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 582, 590 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
302 Id. at 590 (citing Nelson, supra note 2, at 260–61).
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behavior that state law prohibits, the laws would give contradictory commands not-
withstanding the fact that an individual could comply with both by electing to re-
frain from the covered behavior.”303 Instead of engaging this analysis, which would
seem to mean that the FDA law preempted the state jury award because the federal law
authorized Wyeth to do what the state jury sought to prohibit it from doing, Justice
Thomas glibly concluded that he concurred with the majority that there is no preemp-
tion here because “[t]he text of the federal laws at issue do not require that the state-
court judgment at issue be pre-empted, under either the [Court’s] narrow ‘physical
impossibility’ standard, or [Nelson’s] more general ‘direc[t] conflict’ standard.”304
Contrast this with Justice Thomas’s analysis in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,305 which
involved the related, but distinct, question of whether a state court can issue a dam-
ages award against a generic drug manufacturer for failing to provide sufficient warn-
ings on a prescription drug label.306 That the defendants in PLIVA, Inc. were generic
manufacturers was significant because, under FDA regulations, generic drugs are
required to match the label of the brand-name equivalent.307 The PLIVA, Inc. case
therefore raised the question whether the state jury award, in penalizing the generic
manufacturers, and the FDA regulations, in requiring that the generic and brand-
name labels be equivalent, imposed conflicting obligations.308 In an opinion written
by Justice Thomas, the Court found that because the state jury award functioned as a
prohibition on using the label, and the FDA rule functioned as a requirement on
using that same label, the manufacturers were indeed facing a conflict of obligations,
and therefore preemption of such state tort actions was warranted.309
Whereas in Wyeth Justice Thomas glibly recited Nelson’s logical contradiction
test to derive a shallow explanation for why there was no preemption,310 Justice
Thomas presented a very powerful opinion in PLIVA, Inc. for why there was pre-
emption here, and in making this argument, he did not rest his reasoning solely on
Nelson’s test, though he did mention the test in various places.311 Instead, Justice
Thomas began the PLIVA, Inc. analysis exactly as prescribed under my proposed
normative consistency test: “Pre-emption analysis requires us to compare federal and
state law. We therefore begin by identifying the state tort duties and federal labeling
requirements applicable to the Manufacturers.”312 Notice that the question here was
not whether the Court was facing conflicting commands, as Nelson’s test prescribes,
but rather whether the manufacturers, the subjects of the applicable federal and state
303 Id. (citing Nelson, supra note 2, at 260–61).
304 Id. at 591 (internal citations omitted).
305 564 U.S. 604 (2011).
306 Id. at 608–09.
307 Id. at 614.
308 See id. at 609.
309 Id. at 618.
310 See supra notes 301–04 and accompanying text.
311 See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc., 564 U.S. at 621–22 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
312 Id. at 611 (majority opinion).
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laws, were facing such a conflict.313 Also notice that Justice Thomas focused his analy-
sis on the content of the norms, with an emphasis on the fact that they imposed conflict-
ing obligations—i.e., duties and requirements.314 This is exactly what my proposed
test calls for, and it represents an important departure from both the logical contradic-
tion test and the impossibility analysis. While there is certainly room for debate as a
matter of FDA law as to whether Justice Thomas was right that the FDA rule actually
imposes this requirement on generic manufacturers, the form of Justice Thomas’s
analysis is precisely right under my normative consistency test, as opposed to his
much less precise use of Nelson’s logical contradiction test in Wyeth. Indeed, one
can see in PLIVA, Inc. the advantages of my normative consistency test over both
the Court’s impossibility analysis and Nelson’s logical contradiction test. Whereas
the Court’s impossibility test always leaves open the possibility of not finding pre-
emption based on theoretical possibilities,315 and the logical contradiction test would
treat Wyeth and PLIVA, Inc. as the same scenario,316 my normative consistency test,
by focusing only on the norms themselves and using settled rules derived from other
consistency doctrines as to when norms create conflicting obligations so as to war-
rant displacement, is the only test with rules deeply rooted in our legal system and
capable of producing the predictable decision-making so essential to transcending
the political divisions pervading preemption jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
“Consistency,” Kant wrote, “is the highest obligation of a philosopher, and yet
the most rarely found.”317 That also may be said of law. Consistency is surely one
of the most important elements of the rule of law, but it also may be one of the most
difficult features to secure in an actual legal system. Indeed, Hart was right in worrying
that, because of the specter of legal inconsistency, there is always the threat of a
“nervous breakdown”318 underlying the law.
In this Article, I have tried to show how preemption, which is generally thought
of as a rather straightforward federalism doctrine, is in fact much more than that. It
313 See id. at 609.
314 See id. at 623 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
315 After all, as the dissent pointed out, the generic manufacturers could have simply paid
the state jury award and continued using the label, or they could have simply exited the
market in certain states. Id. at 643–45 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). This is why no case before
PLIVA, Inc. had found preemption based on the impossibility branch, and even in PLIVA,
Inc., this outcome was not warranted by the doctrine. Id. at 639–40.
316 This is because in both scenarios courts faced competing laws. Indeed, the logical con-
tradiction test cannot account for why the Court, as well as Justice Thomas in applying the
test, reached discrepant outcomes in these cases.
317 IMMANUEL KANT, Critique of Practical Reason, in KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL
REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS 123, 155 (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
trans., Longman, Green & Co. 2d ed., 1879).
318 Hart, Jr., supra note 24, at 489.
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is a consistency doctrine, one of many ways that our legal system seeks to ensure a
unity of law. As demonstrated in Part I, preemption doctrine cannot be based on
competing and incompatible theories of what it means for laws to be consistent with
one another, for such doctrinal incoherence will produce the preemption politics
currently pervading our jurisprudence. Indeed, I hope that Section I.B.5 has left the
reader with the indelible impression that, at least as far as its preemption jurispru-
dence is concerned, the Roberts Court has been experiencing, and has been generating,
precisely the nervous breakdown that so worried Hart.
In reviewing the various solutions to this problem in Part II, this Article has
sought to illustrate why a formalist approach, though certainly not well-suited for all
legal problems, is particularly well-suited for this one. When a legal problem is a
formal one, the solution should be as well. And the problem that preemption is de-
signed to address—that of making federal and state law consistent—is a thoroughly
formal one. Professor Meltzer’s point is well taken that our polity is too complicated
for simple formal preemption rules,319 but he overlooked the even more serious
problem that the judiciary is not well-suited to addressing this problem with simple
functional standards. We have seen what has resulted when courts have sought to use
functionalist solutions to focus on making legal purposes cohere together, as op-
posed to the more appropriate juridical task of making legal norms consistent with
one another. All sides of the political spectrum have suffered as a result of the in-
coherence. Plaintiffs have been denied rightful remedies, businesses have operated
in unpredictable legal environments, and most importantly for constitutional purposes,
states have been arbitrarily deprived of their regulatory authority.
As explained in Parts III and IV, this formal consistency is required not because
logic commands a particular form of legal consistency, but because that is how our
system of law deals with consistency issues in practice. Normative consistency may
track logic, but the theory of normative consistency advanced in this Article is com-
manded by deep values underlying our entire legal system, not any rule of formal
logic. This recalls Voltaire’s quip: “If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent
him.”320 If the Supremacy Clause did not exist, and legal consistency were not textually
required by any particular constitutional provision, it would be necessary to invent this
requirement, for it is an essential element of the rule of law. Whether this rule-of-law
requirement ultimately resides in metaphysical truths or our own legal constructions,
the most pressing point for purposes of this Article is that a normative consistency is
positively embedded within our concept of preemption.
319 Meltzer, supra note 17, at 7.
320 If God Did Not Exist, It Would Be Necessary to Invent Him, VOLTAIRE SOC’Y AM.,
http://www.whitman.edu/VSA/trois.imposteurs.html [https://perma.cc/L53M-49AZ].
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